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 ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Economic Growth and Natural Resources 
 
Anne W. Walker 
 
This dissertation is a collection of papers examining the relationship between resource intensity 
and economic growth in the Appalachian region of the United States.  The first chapter develops 
a homogenous sample of counties within the Appalachian region and uses that sample to 
investigate how coal resources impact long-run per capita income growth.  The Appalachian 
Regional Commission’s definition of the Appalachian region is the one used most often by 
researchers, politicians, and the popular press.  The uncritical use of this definition of Appalachia 
raises issues of both selection bias and excess heterogeneity in regression analysis of Appalachian 
income and growth.  The ARC was created as part of President Johnson’s war on poverty, and the 
geographical extent of its purview has been driven by politics and by the geography of poverty, 
neither of which is exogenous.  It is well known that the use of endogenous variables to choose a 
sample creates bias and inconsistency in estimation of regression coefficients.  To identify the 
counties that belong to the Appalachian region exogenously we use an algorithm based on three 
criteria:  topography, contiguity, and prevalence of slavery in the 1860 census.  We apply our 
sample to growth regressions using data from 1970 to 2008, addressing the question of the 
existence of a resource curse from coal extraction.  For this model we find strong evidence of 
excess heterogeneity, but not bias. 
 
In the second chapter, I extend the analysis by exploring different possible measures for coal 
resource abundance.  I use both a geologic based measure of “abundance” and a flow based 
measure of “dependence”, and find evidence that coal abundance significantly reduces growth of 
per capita income over the long run with both measures.  In addition, I use a wide variety of 
alternative measures of resource abundance suggested by the literature, all which indicate a 
negative systematic effect of resources on income growth.  I account for the endogeneity of the 
each flow measure with instruments, and when I also account for the endogeneity of initial 
income, results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the measure of resource intensity 
results in a 0.43 percentage point drop in average annual growth. 
 
In the third chapter, I investigate several of the causes for the under-performance by many 
resource rich counties in the Appalachian region. I examine the effect of coal abundance on 
educational attainment, local (county) level education expenditure decisions, and local level 
taxation decisions. I find evidence that the educational attainment channel accounts for a 
significant portion of the negative effect of resource abundance.  Coal resource abundance tends 
to reduce educational attainment, reducing human capital in a county, which in turn reduces per 
capita income growth over the long run.  When attainment is measured by the share of the 
population that dropped out of high school, a one standard deviation increase in the measure of 
resource abundance reduces average annual growth by an estimated 0.125 percentage points.  
When educational attainment is measured instead by the share of the population that completed a 
college degree, average annual growth is reduced by an estimated 0.037 percentage points.  I find 
no evidence that resource abundance affects the education expenditure allocation decisions of 
local county governments, nor do I find evidence that resource rich counties test to under tax their 
populations. 
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Chapter 1 
Sample Selection in Appalachian Research 
1.1 Introduction 
Use of the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) definition of Appalachia has 
become widespread in academia and the popular press.  The ARC was created in 1965 as part of 
President Johnson’s war on poverty, and the counties under its purview were deliberately chosen 
for their low income levels and growth rates. At the same time, the homogeneity of the region 
attracts social science researchers seeking natural experiments to test hypotheses about the 
determinants of poverty and income growth rates using regression analysis. Unfortunately, 
regression coefficients estimated from a sample chosen on criteria that are correlated with a 
regression’s dependent variable will be biased and inconsistent (Heckman, 1979), so the ARC’s 
Appalachian counties constitute a problematic sample for such regressions. To avoid sample 
selection bias in Appalachian income, poverty, and income growth regressions while maximizing 
the homogeneity of the sample, we therefore offer an alternative algorithm for identifying the 
sample that is based on three criteria that are exogenous to income and income growth:  
topography, contiguity, and prevalence of slavery in the 1860 census.   
We demonstrate our method of sample selection by using it to select samples for a set of 
county-level panel data regressions on per capita income growth that seek evidence of a “resource 
curse” from coal extraction. Most previous studies of the resource curse have employed 
international data, which do not allow for sharp identification of the effects of resource 
abundance.  This difficulty of identification arises from the great diversity among countries, 
compounded by measurement problems, omitted variables, and multicollinearity.
 
To address 
these problems in the resource-curse literature, van der Ploeg (2011, p. 381) suggests, “The road 
forward might be to exploit variation within a country where variables that might confound the 
relationship between resources and macroeconomic outcomes do not vary and the danger of 
spurious correlation is minimized.” Thus, if regions are thought of as experimental subjects 
receiving a random treatment of resource endowments, the experiment will more reliably detect 
the treatment effect if the subjects are otherwise homogenous.   
The counties of the Appalachian region of the United States possess relative uniformity 
of culture, topography, and history that developed over a period of isolation from the rest of the 
country. They, therefore, present a nearly ideal population for the type of study suggested by van 
der Ploeg.  The approximately equal number of treatment (i.e., coal-bearing) and control counties 
within the region also provide a desirable balance of experimental design.  The ARC’s definition 
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of the Appalachian region, however, introduces unwanted heterogeneity and raises the possibility 
of bias and inconsistency due to the endogeneity of its sample selection process.  We propose to 
ameliorate both endogenous sample selection and excess heterogeneity by using exogenous 
variables to identify counties whose primary source of diversity is the presence or absence of 
commercially mineable coal.  Our objective, quite simply, is to obtain an Appalachian county 
sample that is as homogeneous as can be obtained using exogenous criteria.   
Comparing our regression results from different samples, we find evidence of excess 
heterogeneity but not bias due to sample selection. Despite the lack of bias in our particular 
application, the methods and reasoning that we use in selecting our sample have implications for 
future studies of development in resource-rich regions, including those whose exploitable 
resource base has recently expanded due to the development of new extraction technologies.  
Better sample selection techniques will allow more accurate conclusions about the effects of 
resource abundance on economic growth, which will provide a firmer basis for policy decisions 
affecting the speed and nature of resource development.   
 
1.2 Sample Selection Method 
The Appalachian region south of New England possesses a distinct and robust culture 
that flows from its unique history.  The immigrants settling this region in the eighteenth century 
were primarily of Scotch-Irish extraction, as opposed to the English, German, and African origins 
of the inhabitants of the Southern lowlands. There is a large literature describing distinctive 
characteristics of the southern Appalachian highlanders, including their close ties to land and 
family, distrust of outsiders, pugnaciousness, and independent spirit.
1 
 For more than a century 
after the American Revolution there was little immigration into the region, and a culture of 
defiant independence grew up among the subsistence farmers living in these isolated uplands.  
One marker of the region’s distinctive culture and economy was the hostility of its inhabitants to 
the Confederacy in the Civil War, which led to the wartime secession of West Virginia from 
Virginia.  Despite (or because of) its semi-pariah status among urban Americans, the “hillbilly” 
culture of the Southern Appalachians has persisted.  More than that, it has contributed highly 
visible elements to mainstream American culture, including the coonskin-capped pioneer icon, 
the Clampett and Snopes families, roots of bluegrass and country music, and NASCAR auto 
racing. Immigrants from other cultures that came to work in the Appalachian coal fields and 
                                                 
1 For example, Fischer (1989) provides an exhaustive treatment of the Appalachian Scotch-Irish culture, with emphasis 
upon its origins in the violent and impoverished regions on the border of Scotland and England. 
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forests in the last century were largely absorbed into this culture, which still predominates in the 
region. Despite considerable economic development in the past half-century, poverty still 
predominates in the region as well.   
The Appalachian Regional Commission was created in 1965 as part of President 
Johnson’s war on poverty.  Its identification of the counties under its purview was then, and has 
continued to be, much affected by the politics and geography of poverty. The Kennedy 
administration established the Presidential Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) in 1963, 
which consisted of federal officials and the governors of nine Appalachian states.
2 
 The PARC 
hired a staff of academics that produced a report identifying 340 Appalachian counties in ten 
states including Ohio (ARC, 1964).  To aid passage of the Appalachian Regional Development 
Act of 1965, which created the ARC, Congress further expanded the list of Appalachian states to 
include South Carolina (Bradshaw, 1992).  Mississippi and New York were added to the list in 
1967, and more counties have been added since to bring the current total to 420 counties in 13 
states. Adding counties to the ARC is a purely political process (Bradshaw, 1992), but its 
programs are designed to help poor counties, and poorer counties are therefore chosen for 
membership.  For example, most Mississippi counties were added in 1967 explicitly because of 
their poverty. Though poor, most of these counties are not topographically, demographically, or 
culturally part of the Appalachian region.  Similarly, many counties in topographically flat but 
economically depressed northeastern Ohio have been added to the ARC since that region’s 
economic decline began in the 1970s.  Thus, the ARC’s county designations are clearly not 
exogenous to income growth rates, raising issues of bias and inconsistency in coefficient 
estimates from growth regressions. Addition of counties that do not share the Appalachian culture 
and history has added to the heterogeneity of the sample as well, which decreases the precision of 
estimates.   
The Appalachian culture is tightly tied to the rugged topography of the Appalachian 
countryside. To identify the counties that belong to the Appalachian region we have therefore 
used an algorithm based on three exogenous criteria that reflect Appalachian landforms and the 
exogenous constraints they place on economic activity.  One criterion is the set of Land Surface 
Form Topography Codes compiled by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 1970).  These codes, 
which are listed in Appendix 3, range from 1 (Flat Plains) to 21 (High Mountains), and broadly 
increase in relief as the numbers increase.  The progression of codes is not perfectly monotonic, 
                                                 
2 The original nine ARC states were Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania. 
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however, which led to some difficult implementation problems.  For example, it is unclear 
whether “plains with low mountains” (code 11) are more or less mountainous than “open hills” 
(code 14), and it is not obvious whether code 8 counties (“tablelands, very high relief”) should be 
counted as Appalachian.  After some study, it became clear to us that we needed other exogenous 
criteria to classify some counties. 
To supplement our sample selection algorithm we use the percentage of slaves in the 
county as enumerated in the 1860 Census.   Prevalence of slavery within a county indicated its 
economic system, demography, culture, social relationships, and political loyalties.  Because of 
poor soil and rough terrain, plantation agriculture and slavery never took hold in the Southern 
Appalachians. The inverse correlation between slavery prevalence and mountainous terrain is 
readily apparent in Edwin Hergesheimer’s famous 1861 “Map Showing the Distribution of the 
Slave Population of the Southern States of the United States,” an official publication of the U.S. 
Census Bureau that is reproduced in Figure 1.1.
3
  Our third criterion is geographical contiguity 
with other Appalachian counties, including information about the continuation and prevalence of 
ridges and mountainous terrain obtained from the terrain feature of Google Maps 
maps.google.com.   
                                                 
3 See http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/akerman/maps_slavery.html for a brief history of the significance of this 
map.  We downloaded our copy from the Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/item/99447026, specifically the 15.9 
MB jp2 file at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/gmd/gmd386/g3861/g3861e/cw0013200.jp2.  
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Figure 1.1: “Map Showing the Distribution of the Slave Population of the Southern States of 
the United States,” by Edwin Hergesheimer 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1861. 
Our algorithm identifies both a narrow set of 250 “core” Appalachian counties with both 
mountainous terrain and low slave percentages, and a more broadly defined set of 409 counties 
with either smoother terrain and fewer slaves or rougher terrain and more slaves.  Specifically, 
the core Appalachian counties include all contiguous counties with USGS topography codes 
exceeding 14 and 1860 Census enslavement ratios of 10 percent or less.  We also include in the 
Appalachian core counties possessing topography codes of five through nine and 1860 Census 
slave percentages of 10 percent or less. Counties containing Chattanooga and Knoxville 
Tennessee, Asheville North Carolina, and Charleston West Virginia were included in the 
Appalachian core despite their relatively high slave percentages (10 to 17 percent) because of 
their high topographic relief and their roles as centers of Appalachian culture and commerce.
4
 To 
designate our more broadly-defined Appalachian counties, we added 159 counties to the 250 in 
the core.  Most of these additional counties have topography codes of five to nine or higher, all 
have slave percentages above 10 percent, and all are contiguous to other Appalachian counties.  
The additional counties in the broadly-defined Appalachian region include contiguous counties 
with topography codes of ten and 1860 slave populations of 20-28 percent, as well as a few 
                                                 
4 We excluded Birmingham, Alabama, from the core (but not the broad) Appalachian designation because of Jefferson 
County, Alabama’s 22 percent slave ratio in 1860.   
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counties in South Carolina and Virginia with higher slave percentages but topography codes of 20 
(“low mountains”).   
Table 1.1 shows that Appalachian per capita personal income is relatively low, and it 
drops a little as one goes deeper into Appalachia. The ARC and Narrow definitions of Appalachia 
are similar in terms of income, poverty rates, and unemployment rates.  In addition, the ethnicity 
and demographic data presented in Table 1.1 provide some support for the idea that the 
Appalachian counties are similar to each other and different from non-Appalachian counties.  For 
example, Appalachian populations are about 25 percentage points more ethnically white than the 
other counties in the ARC states, and their ethnicity is less variable from county to county.  
Appalachian residents are slightly more likely to claim British or Irish descent than residents of 
other regions in the ARC states, and are less likely to claim German descent.  They are also 
slightly more likely to be native English speakers, which is not surprising given the relative 
paucity of Hispanic and other recent immigrants in Appalachian counties. The ARC’s willingness 
to add fringe counties to its purview on the basis of poverty means that ARC-designated 
Appalachian counties are less white and more variable in ethnicity than those designated by our 
algorithm, though they are about equally poor.   
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics by Region within the 13 ARC States 
  Appalachian Status Definition 
 
Not App Broadly App Core App ARC 
Real Per Capita Income Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Personal Income 1970 11975 3478 10936 2779 10456 2828 10622 2573 
Personal Income 1980 13644 4057 12653 2792 12207 2803 12383 2700 
Personal Income 1990 16920 5412 14841 3622 13999 3385 14502 3373 
Personal Income 2000 19748 6706 17060 4300 16005 3855 16673 4050 
White 1960 0.708 0.187 0.964 0.052 0.979 0.032 0.929 0.119 
White Non-Hispanic 1990 0.736 0.159 0.965 0.047 0.979 0.026 0.937 0.108 
Poverty Rate 1990 0.174 0.087 0.177 0.079 0.194 0.086 0.186 0.078 
Number of Counties 660 409 250 420 
Number of Coal Counties 13 174 142 181 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the differences and commonalities among the ARC, core, and broad 
definitions of Appalachia, and Table 1.2 provides cross-tabulations. Table 1.3 provides some 
descriptive statistics of the counties that are affected by differences among the various methods of 
designating the region.  Our broad definition of the Appalachian includes 353 (84 percent) of the 
ARC counties, though we exclude 113 of those common counties from our “core” Appalachian 
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designation.  These 113 include some with moderately high slave percentages, concentrated in 
Alabama, Mississippi, East Tennessee, and central Kentucky, in the New, Holston, and 
Shenandoah river valleys of Virginia, and in the Carolina Piedmont.  They also include some 
ARC counties with moderate topographical relief in Ohio and New York.   
 
Table 1.2:  Cross-Tabulation of Appalachian Counties and ARC Counties within ARC 
States 
    Appalachian Broadly Defined    Appalachian Core  
 
  No Yes Total       No Yes Total 
ARC No 593 56 649 
 
ARC No 639 10 649 
 
Yes 67 353 420 
  
Yes 180 240 420 
  Total 660 409 1069     Total 819 250 1069 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Appalachian County Designations 
 
 
There are significant discrepancies between even our broad definition of Appalachia and 
the ARC definition of Appalachia.  Most of the 67 ARC counties that our method excludes 
entirely from Appalachia (ARC/Not-Broad in Table 1.3) are poor counties located on the fringe 
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of Appalachia in Alabama, Mississippi, and northeastern Ohio.  Table 1.3 shows that these ARC 
counties are overall much less ethnically white than the others, and the standard errors of the 
ethnicity variables indicate much more ethnic variability as well.  Their poverty levels and 
incomes are similar to those of the Appalachian region listed in Table 1.3, but their poverty may 
be more driven by the legacy of slavery or the decline of manufacturing than is the case in 
Appalachia proper.   
We also include 56 non-ARC counties in our broad definition of Appalachia, of which 
ten are defined as part of the Appalachian core. The 46 broadly Appalachian, but non-core and 
non-ARC, counties are concentrated in the middle Tennessee River valley, the coal regions of 
west central Kentucky, the rugged country around the Ohio River west of Cincinnati, and the 
eastern ridges of the Alleghenies in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York.  The ten 
counties included in core Appalachia but excluded from the ARC are concentrated in the 
Adirondacks and Catskills of New York, but also include Shenandoah County, Virginia and 
Grayson County, Kentucky, which enslaved only 5.5 percent and 4.4 percent of their inhabitants, 
respectively, in 1860.  Figures in Table 1.3 indicate that these 56 counties are similar in ethnicity 
to the rest of Appalachia, but their relatively low poverty rates and high incomes probably explain 
their exclusion from the ARC.   
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics by Non-Overlapping Regions 
  Appalachian Status Definition 
 
ARC 
/NotBroad Broad/NotCore Core/NotARC Broad/NotARC 
 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Real Per Capita Income n=67 n=159 n=10 n=56 
Personal Income 1970 10934 2510 11759 2591 12768 1892 13291 2825 
Personal Income 1980 12507 2746 13422 2688 13088 1642 14507 2700 
Personal Income 1990 15170 3581 16281 3781 16611 2515 17776 4064 
Personal Income 2000 17363 4115 18906 4856 17858 2506 20324 4549 
White 1960 0.75 0.188 0.939 0.069 0.981 0.016 0.968 0.03 
White Non-Hisp. 1990 0.779 0.177 0.939 0.074 0.953 0.04 0.954 0.043 
Poverty Rate 1990 0.189 0.72 0.152 0.057 0.12 0.043 0.123 0.053 
 
1.3 Application: The Coal Resource Curse 
1.3.1 Model and Data 
In this section we describe a simple panel data regression model designed to search for a 
coal resource curse effect in Appalachia.  As discussed above, we rely upon the relative 
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homogeneity of our sample to minimize the influence of omitted variables, allowing us to specify 
a parsimonious model with only a few control variables.  Our resource abundance measure Coal0 
varies little through time, as it simply indicates whether or not a county contains commercially 
relevant coal deposits.  Since the variation in Coal0 is almost entirely in the cross-sectional 
dimension, we employ cross-sectional fixed effects only at the state level.   
The search for a resource curse has generated a lively debate in the literature.  Although 
the debate has attracted interest from economists since Adam Smith, a recent upsurge of interest 
has followed from a series of papers by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001).  Van der Ploeg 
(2011) provides the most recent survey of this literature, but useful surveys are also available 
from Ross (1999), Auty (2001), and Barbier (2005) as well.  Most empirical work in this area has 
used cross-sectional analysis on international data, comparing long-run economic growth rates 
across large samples of both developed and developing countries.  The empirical equations echo 
those found in the empirical growth model literature, which are derived from the neoclassical 
Solow growth model.   
Very few previous studies have used sub-national data to address the resource curse 
question.  Michaels (2011) uses county-level data to investigate the effect of oil resources on a 
variety of measures, including personal income and employment density, and devotes much 
attention to the problem of sample selection.  In contrast to much of the rest of the empirical 
resource curse literature, he finds a positive effect of resource abundance on employment density 
and income growth, which he attributes to agglomeration economies.  His paper is also of special 
interest here because he attempts to limit heterogeneity by drawing his sample only from counties 
within 200 miles of an oil resource.   
James and Aadland (2011) found significant negative growth effects of resource 
abundance using a national cross section of 3092 counties over the 1980-1995 time period.  
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) also found a resource curse using state-level U.S. data 
(specifically, they estimated that a one percent increase in resource abundance decreases growth 
by about 0.047 percent).  There are also a few unpublished papers using sub-national data.  They 
include Caselli and Michaels (2009), which looks at the effect of oil resources in different regions 
of Brazil, and dissertation chapters by Sen (2010), Corey (2008), and Dunn (2008), which employ 
U.S. data measured at the state and (in the case of Sen) county level.  Like James and Aadland 
(2011), these latter three studies analyze the United States as a whole and define resource 
abundance broadly, whereas we focus on Appalachia and coal in order to identify the mechanism 
sharply.   
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A few recent papers examine the resource curse specifically in the Appalachian region, 
and most of the empirical results are broadly in line with our finding of a modest negative effect 
of coal mining on income growth.  Deaton and Niman (2012), and Partridge, Betz, and Lobao 
(2012) both examine the problem using poverty rates as the dependent variable.  Deaton and 
Niman (2012) examined poverty as a function of mining employment in Appalachia and 
estimated that a one percent increase in mining employment results in a net increase in poverty of 
approximately 15 percent.  Partridge, Betz, and Lobao also find a mostly positive association 
between coal mining and poverty, but they also find evidence that the association has weakened 
recently.  Black, McKinnish, & Sanders (2005b) examined the effects of coal mining on earnings 
during the boom and bust cycle of the late 1970s to early 1980s, and found that the down-cycle 
effects predominated, as earnings grew 5 percent faster during the boom, but 5.5 percent slower 
during the bust. Harkness (2010) used a sample of Kentucky counties to examine the resource 
curse and found no conclusive evidence of a resource curse associated with coal.   
Economic growth models such as the one we use in this study have been employed in the 
study of other issues in Appalachia.  These include a recent paper by Ziliak (2011), one of many 
that seeks to measure the efficacy of the ARC in reducing poverty by comparing outcomes in 
ARC counties to similar counties that are not included in the ARC.  Ziliak (2011) compares 
Appalachian counties to adjacent and surrounding counties, and to other U.S. rural counties.  
Isserman and Rephann (1995) used a quadratic distance metric to match Appalachian counties to 
their twins outside of Appalachia.  Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) compare Appalachian counties to 
other non-coastal counties within their respective states.   
Our specific question involves a comparison of counties within Appalachia.  We specify 
a panel data regression model of annualized growth rates, measured as the difference in log per 
capita personal income divided by the length of the period, git for county i in state s at time t: 
                                                                                          (1) 
where       is the level of per capita personal income in county i at the beginning of time period 
t,         is a measure of coal resource abundance,     is a state fixed effect, and     is a vector 
of exogenous variables. The standard Solow model calls for a region to exhibit conditional 
convergence to a balanced growth path, which implies a negative coefficient,    on the initial 
income variable.  We include state fixed effects because institutional characteristics such as 
income, severance, sales, and inheritance taxes, broad infrastructure and educational policy, 
judicial system, much law enforcement (including environmental law enforcement), and 
corruption are all strongly affected by statewide institutions. We do not include county fixed 
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effects because the variation in coal resource abundance is cross-sectional in nature and varies 
little through time, and county fixed effects would remove all time-invariant, cross-sectional 
differences.   
An ideal resource abundance variable should be exogenous, and it should indicate the 
presence of the resource in a way that reflects both the resource extraction process and the 
hypothesized transmission channels for the resource curse.  In the current study, we believe that if 
there is an Appalachian coal resource curse the primary transmission channels for it would be 
through 1) depressed educational attainment by students who terminate their formal education 
early to take relatively highly paid coal mining jobs that do not require much formal education, 2) 
economic disruption and long-term unemployment caused by the boom and bust cycle, and 
perhaps 3) long-term health effects. The effects of these channels, if they exist at all, would 
persist over a long time period; therefore our resource abundance variable should not be too 
sensitive to current production, or it should employ a lag structure of some length.  Simplicity of 
both construction and interpretation are also desirable. We therefore employ an indicator variable 
Coal0, equal to one if the county has ever produced and sold any coal, as of the initial year of the 
time period.  This dummy variable is likely exogenous because the Appalachian coal fields are 
mature:  nearly all of the counties, including all of the major coal producing counties, initiated 
coal production before our sample period.
5
   The samples are well balanced with respect to this 
variable: as of 1990, 46 percent of the ARC counties, 61 percent of our core, and 47 percent of 
our broadly defined Appalachian counties had produced at least some coal.   
Our choice of control variables xit is limited by our research goal of estimating a reduced 
form equation.  Past researchers, seeking to explore possible mechanisms or channels for the 
resource curse, have included a variety of control variables thought to influence the long-run 
average growth of an economy, many of which introduced endogeneity concerns.  To mitigate 
endogeneity problems, we limit the number of controls.  The drawback of this research strategy is 
that it does not allow us to determine the channel of operation of the resource curse, if any.  On 
the other hand, the strategy does allow us a cleaner test for the existence of the resource curse, 
given a homogenous sample.   
Appalachian poverty is often attributed to geographic isolation and consequent lack of 
access to transportation, financial centers, higher education, and other growth-enhancing 
amenities associated with urban areas.  Accordingly, we have included dummy variables derived 
                                                 
5 In this respect, our Coal0 variable resembles the resource abundance variable used by Michaels (2011), which was a 
measure of the total amount of oil resource that existed prior to exploitation.   
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from the USDA’s Rural-Urban Continuum (“Beale”) Codes. Beale Codes are available for 1974, 
1983, 1993, and 2003, and are based primarily on data from the previous census. So we treat 
them as exogenous beginning-of-period values for their respective decades.  Because they are 
non-monotonic, we use them to create two dummy variables that indicate rural and metro 
counties, respectively.   
Table 1.4:  Descriptions of Variables and Descriptive Statistics for 1069 counties in Thirteen 
ARC States 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
Average annual growth rate of per capita 
personal income, net of taxes and 
transfers 
0.013 0.013 -0.042 0.093 
Initial 
Income 
Log of beginning of period log per capita 
personal income 
9.554 0.331 8.322 11.249 
Metro 
County 
 = 1 if Beale code ≤ 3 (Metro area) 0.325 0.468 0 1 
Rural County 
 = 1 if Beale code ≥ 7 (Very Rural, or 
urban population < 20,000, not adjacent 
to an urban county) 
0.377 0.485 0 1 
(dOil Price)x 
(Coal0) 
(Percent change in real oil price over 
period) times Coal0 
0.079 0.473 -0.940 1.650 
Coal 0 
= 1 if county has produced coal 
commercially, as of initial year of period 
(220 of 1069 as of year 2000) 
0.203 0.402 0 1 
The panel data structure includes four time periods—the decades beginning in 1970, 
1980, and 1990, along with the nine-year period 2000-2008, which are used to construct the time 
fixed effects dummies.  The inclusion of time fixed effects is standard in panel growth models, as 
they essentially transform each variable into a difference from its cross-sectional mean as of time 
t, which controls for the business cycle and other shocks common to all counties at a given time.  
To control for the cyclical and secular effects of changes in energy prices on counties that 
produce coal, we include an interaction variable that is the product of the (log-difference) 
percentage change in real oil price and Coal0.
6
   
We obtained the data for our economic growth and initial income variables from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Regional Economic Accounts.  We adjusted the measure by 
subtracting government transfers, and deflated to constant-year terms using a base year of 2000.  
Coal production data were obtained from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the U.S. 
                                                 
  6 The average real price of oil in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 was $19.65, $102.26, $39.80, and $35.76, respectively. 
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Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the Beale codes were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).  Coal and oil price data were obtained from the EIA. 
1.3.2 Results 
We estimated equation (1) using time and state-level fixed effects in panel data 
regressions, and report the results in Table 1.5 along with robust standard errors.  There are four 
columns of results from four different samples.  The column labeled “All” includes all counties in 
the 13 Appalachian states, regardless of whether or not the counties are part of Appalachia.  The 
other columns correspond to the samples chosen as explained in detail above.   
The coefficients shown in Table 1.5 are of expected signs and reasonable magnitudes.  
The estimated coefficient on beginning of period income (  ) is negative and significant at the 
one percent level in all specifications, indicating conditional convergence of per capita income.  
The asymptotic rate of convergence can be inferred (Higgins, Levy, & Young, 2006) from the 
BOP income coefficient estimate as c = 1 – (Tβ)1/T. Coefficient estimates range from -0.013 to -
0.023, implying a convergence rate of 1.3 percent to 2.3 percent per year.  Appalachian counties 
are estimated to have faster rates of convergence.  As expected, the coefficient estimates for the 
metro dummy variable is positive and significant.  Estimates for the rural dummy variable 
coefficient are of the expected sign, but not significant.  Coefficient estimates for the interaction 
variable between the change in real oil price and the Coal0 dummy variable are all positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level, consistent with energy prices’ well-known short-term positive 
effect on income in coal-producing Appalachian counties.   
The coefficient estimates on Coal0 suggest a moderate but significant coal resource 
curse, slowing expected economic growth by an estimated 0.3 percent to 0.4 percentage points 
per year.  Over time, even such small decreases in average annual income growth have a sizeable 
impact on income levels.  For example, a drop in average annual income growth of 0.4 
percentage points results in income levels being lowered by about 17.3 percent over forty years, 
with compounding.  Therefore, our estimates indicate that counties with coal mining present were 
15 to 20 percent poorer by the end of the forty year period covered by our sample than similarly 
rural counties within the same state that started with the same income but lacked a coal resource.  
Following Black et al. (2005b), we also estimated the model with (state)*(time) interaction terms 
to account for state-specific growth rate variations through time. We report the results in 
Appendix 4. Generally, this alternative model finds a smaller but still significant negative 
association between coal mining and economic growth.  The estimated effect of the coal resource 
shrinks enough to become statistically insignificant for the Core Appalachian counties.   
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Table 1.5:  Growth Regression Results  
Dependent Variable: Annualized Growth Rates of Per Capita Personal Income 1970-2008 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-2008), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  ALL APPALACHIAN 
  COUNTIES BROAD         CORE      ARC 
Intercept 0.1309*** 0.1958*** 0.2214*** 0.2033*** 
 
(0.0246) (0.0144) (0.0300) (0.0228) 
Initial Income -0.0133*** -0.0202*** -0.0227*** -0.0210*** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0024) 
Metro 0.0049*** 0.0046*** 0.0040*** 0.0045*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Rural -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0018** -0.0010 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
dOilPrice*Coal0 0.0063*** 0.0066*** 0.0070*** 0.0064*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
Coal0 -0.0044*** -0.0045*** -0.0035** -0.0033*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0011) 
#Counties 1069 409 250 420 
sigma_u 0.0023 0.0026 0.0033 0.0025 
sigma_e 0.0108 0.0102 0.0104 0.0100 
rho 0.0431 0.0592 0.0892 0.0577 
R-Square 
    Within  0.3050 0.3522 0.3133 0.3721 
Between 0.1021 0.0406 0.0793 0.1306 
Overall  0.3027 0.3374 0.2868 0.3504 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Does our sample selection algorithm make any difference in the estimates?  Somewhat 
surprisingly, given the clear endogeneity of the ARC’s sample selection, the coefficient estimates 
for ARC, Core, Broad, and All county samples are of a similar magnitude.  This similarity of 
results suggests that sample selection bias is not a large problem for this particular data set and 
model.  The similarity of the standard errors across models, however, indicates possible excess 
heterogeneity in the ARC sample.  Smaller data sets imply larger coefficient standard errors, 
which should increase according to the square root of the ratio of sample sizes. The Core 
Appalachian data set contains many fewer counties than the other three, (about 60 percent of the 
ARC and Broad samples, and 23 percent of the All sample).   These sample size effects suggest 
that standard deviations of the Core estimates should be approximately 1.3 times those of the 
ARC estimates and twice those of the All sample estimates.  Instead, the standard deviations of 
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coefficients for the three sample sizes are of similar magnitude for most coefficients, consistent 
with our assertion that the Core data sets are more homogeneous. 
To further explore this issue of the efficiency gain from using our method of selecting 
Appalachian counties we performed a bootstrap sampling experiment to see whether our Core 
sample’s estimated standard errors are low by chance, or because the sample was well-chosen.7  
In each of 10,000 bootstrap repetitions we drew randomly (with replacement) a sample of 250 
counties from the set of 420 ARC counties. The sample size of 250 counties was chosen to reflect 
the number of counties in the Core Appalachian sample, so that the sample represented a Core-
size sample of counties drawn at random from the population of ARC counties.  In each case all 
four time-series observations were used from each county, so that the total size of the data set in 
each sample was 4n = 1000.  If the Core sample is no more homogeneous than the ARC sample, 
we would expect Core coefficient standard errors to rank at about the 50
th
 percentile of the 
standard errors from all the bootstrap samples.  For each bootstrap repetition b we applied our 
empirical model to the bootstrap sample to estimate the k-vector of regression coefficients ^ *b  
from that sample, along with its kxk coefficient covariance matrix Cov(^ *b ).  We then compared 
the size of Cov(^ *b ) to the comparable covariance matrix obtained from our sample of 250 Core 
Appalachian counties Cov(^core).  To do so, we calculated Cov(^ *b )  Cov(^core) and tested to 
see if the result was positive definite, which would indicate that our Core sample’s covariance 
matrix was smaller than the bootstrap sample’s covariance.  We found that our Core sample’s 
covariance matrix was smaller than all but 12 percent of the bootstrap samples’ covariance 
matrices drawn from the ARC counties, which indicates a high degree of uniformity of the Core 
sample relative to the ARC sample.  
 
1.4 Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Future Directions 
The empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth has long been impeded 
by problems of unobserved heterogeneity, multicollinearity, and endogeneity found in 
international data sets.  The resource curse literature has exactly the same set of problems, and for 
the same reasons.  The answers to many important questions are not identified in the data because 
we don’t have enough exogenous structural variables or good instruments to control for all of the 
heterogeneity of the world’s nations.  For many years researchers in this area have sought to solve 
                                                 
    7 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the bootstrap experiment.   
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the problem by using more sophisticated econometric methods and choosing instruments more 
cleverly.   
We have addressed these problems by implementing a novel sample selection approach.  
Rather than trying to model and control for heterogeneity and endogeneity, we use exogenous 
criteria to construct a data set that minimizes heterogeneity.  We have laid out the reasons why we 
regard the Appalachian region of the U.S. as a good candidate for this style of inquiry (uniform 
data collection, cultural homogeneity, balanced treatment design, and a set of questions that has 
attracted the keen interest of policy makers for half a century), and we have gathered a panel data 
set that has allowed us to isolate the presence of coal production as a source of exogenous 
variation.  The results for our particular application suggest that any problems created by using 
the ARC definition of Appalachia for estimation of the resource curse arise more from the 
introduction of sampling noise rather than from bias due to endogenous sample selection.  Partly, 
this result may be driven by the fact that few of the counties that are included in the ARC 
Appalachian sample but excluded from the Core Appalachian sample possess coal resources, 
meaning that heterogeneity in the economic growth variable in the excluded ARC counties arises 
from sources other than the resource abundance variable.   
The lessons of this study are much clearer with respect to the possible efficiency gains 
from careful attention to sample selection.  Our bootstrap experiment indicates that judicious use 
of exogenous cultural and geographical indicators to refine the sample selection algorithm can 
substantially reduce sampling variation, even within a sample such as the ARC counties that is 
already relatively homogeneous. It may be possible to improve upon the simple geographic 
contiguity and proximity measure used for sample selection by Michaels (2011), for example, if 
the researcher has sufficient knowledge of the region, creativity, and access to appropriate 
exogenous variables.  Researchers seeking to study the impact of Marcellus Shale development 
may be able to apply some form of the sample selection algorithm developed here. Useful sample 
selection algorithms for studies of the Bakken or resources farther afield must be tailored to the 
characteristics of those regions, but this study may be of some use as an example of the kinds of 
variables to seek when developing such algorithms.   
Although lagged income, rurality, topography, and location of mineral deposits are not 
endogenous, they are not policy variables either, which unfortunately limits the policy 
implications that may be drawn from our reduced-form empirical results.  That does not mean 
that there are no policy implications of our analysis.  Our results so far cast some doubt on the 
notion that encouraging coal extraction is tantamount to encouraging growth.  They provide some 
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support for those who suggest that well-considered regulatory impediments to unbridled coal 
extraction could actually encourage economic growth in the regions where the resources are 
found.  This is a point that is not obvious to many policy makers, focused as they are on the 
benefits arising from exploitation of new sources of energy such as oil shale, tar sands, and shale 
gas.  On the other hand, as Michaels (2011) demonstrated, those who assume that resource 
abundance and exploitation is always a curse may also be mistaken.  Determining the conditions 
under which resource extraction may be conducted to the benefit of those who live where the 
resource is abundant is the task of social science researchers.  The first step in getting clear 
answers from statistical analysis is to choose an appropriate sample that minimizes noise and 
bias.   
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Chapter 2 
An Analysis of Resource Curse Channels in the Appalachian Region 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Evidence suggests that natural resource abundance can be either a curse or a blessing, but 
examples of countries that seem cursed by their resources are much more common.  The 
“resource curse” refers to the widespread empirical finding that many areas rich in natural 
resources are cursed by lower income levels and slower economic growth.  It can be described as 
a failure to capitalize on the potential growth opportunities presented by natural resources.  The 
resource curse literature is extensive, and has investigated the channels or mechanisms through 
which natural resources tend to frustrate growth. 
However, empirical work related to economic growth is notoriously susceptible to problems 
of endogeneity and omitted variables bias, and the resource curse literature is no exception.  
These issues are especially problematic when using international data sets, as is most often the 
case in the resource curse literature.  Recently, a few studies have used sub-national level data 
(state, county, or municipality) to mitigate the statistical problems which arise from the inherent 
heterogeneity of international data.  These include Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), which uses 
U.S. state level data; and Black, McKinnish, & Sanders (2005a, 2005b), James and Aadland 
(2011), and Deaton and Niman (2012), which use U.S. county level data.  In a recent survey 
article on the resource curse appearing in the Journal of Economic Literature, Frederick van der 
Ploeg (2011) put it this way: 
Cross-country and panel-data results are sensitive to changing the sample period, the 
sample of countries, or the definition of various explanatory variables. The data may 
simply not allow one to distinguish, for example, whether it is openness to international 
trade, quality of institutions, or financial development since these variables are highly 
correlated. The road forward might be to exploit variation within a country where 
variables that might confound the relationship between resources and macroeconomic 
outcomes do not vary and the danger of spurious correlation is minimized. (JEL 49:2, 
p. 381). 
I use the set of 409 broadly defined Appalachian counties as described in the first chapter, 
and in Douglas and Walker (2012).  In this paper I use this relatively homogenous sample to 
empirically study the resource curse and its potential channels.  By comparing counties in the 
region that have relatively large coal industries to counties that produce no coal, and controlling 
for other confounding factors which affect economic growth, I measure the effect of resource 
abundance on long run income growth using the natural experiment of variation in coal 
endowments in the Appalachia region.  Using a more homogenous regional sample has several 
19 
 
advantages: first, it mitigates problems related to omitted variable bias since counties of the same 
region of a nation likely have similar backgrounds, histories, and institutions that influence 
growth.  There is less unobservable heterogeneity across counties of the same region than across 
different countries.  Secondly, data quality and measurement error are common problems with 
cross country data, but data collected in the U.S. are generally considered more reliable and 
uniform.  Lastly, counties do not have exchange rate variation, and there is little variation in the 
price level across the region.   
The Appalachian region, in particular central Appalachia, has historically constituted one of 
the poorest regions of the United States.  The poverty rate in Appalachia in 1965 was about 33% 
compared to a national average of about 20%.  By 2008 the percentage of Appalachians living in 
poverty had dropped to 18%, compared to the national average of approximately 13% (ARC).  
But these economic gains have not been distributed evenly across the region.  In 2008, the 
Appalachian Regional Commission classified nearly 20 percent of counties in Appalachia (82 of 
420) as “economically distressed.”8  The majority of these distressed counties lie in the central 
portion of the region, primarily in Kentucky and West Virginia, as shown in Appendix 3.  
The Appalachian region is also rich in natural resources, especially coal.  Coal production in 
the Appalachian region accounts for over one third of all coal produced annually in the United 
States (EIA).  Coal production in West Virginia alone, which is the largest coal producing state in 
the region and the second largest in the nation, accounted for 13.5 percent of total U.S. coal 
production in 2008 (EIA 2009).  Furthermore, the poorest areas within the Appalachian region are 
counties where coal mining dominates the local economy, as shown in Figure 2.1. A ‘coal 
producing county’ in this study denotes a county that produced coal during the initial year of the 
respective decade. 
                                                 
8    The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) was created in 1963 by President Kennedy (and enacted by 
Congress in 1965) in order to help spur economic growth in the region.  
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Figure 2.1: Real per Capita Income, Coal versus Non-Coal Counties in Appalachia 
 
These observations naturally lead to the question of whether a resource curse exists in the 
Appalachian region.  I investigate whether coal resource abundance negatively affects growth in 
the sample of Appalachian counties.  I find evidence that coal abundance significantly reduces 
growth of per capita income over the long run.  A one standard deviation increase in the resource 
abundance variable is associated with a reduction in average annual growth by an estimated 0.17 
to 0.78 percentage points. 
This paper makes several contributions to the resource curse literature.  First, I am aware of 
no other published papers that study the resource curse in Appalachia by examining income 
growth over the long run.  Most studies use poverty (Deaton and Niman, 2012; Partridge et al., 
2012) or employment growth (Black et al., 2005b)   Second, I use a carefully chosen sample of 
sub-national county level data to minimize unobservable heterogeneity across my sample, and 
therefore more precisely estimate the effect of resource abundance on growth.  Third, I use 
instrumental variable techniques to account for the potential endogeneity of resource abundance 
measures and initial income.  Lastly, I use multiple measures of resource abundance to verify the 
robustness of my results. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 provides a brief overview 
of the resource curse literature.  Section 2.3 defines the measures of resource abundance used in 
this study.  Section 2.4 presents the empirical models, section 2.5 provides results of the 
estimations, and section 2.6 summarizes the conclusions and main results. 
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2.2 Brief Review of the Resource Curse Literature  
2.2.1 Channels of the Resource Curse 
Theoretical arguments regarding the existence and magnitude of the resource curse have 
hypothesized several different mechanisms or “channels” through which the resource curse might 
operate.  In general, the channels represent growth promoting activities that are somehow 
negatively affected by natural resource abundance.  Much of the recent resource curse literature 
focuses on institutions as the primary mechanism through which resource abundance negatively 
affects growth.  This is not surprising in light of the recent emphasis placed on institutions as a 
significant determinant in the more general economic growth literature (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2001, 2002).  Some studies view the resource curse as a result of resource abundance 
in the presence of pre-existing poor institutions. For example, Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik (2006) 
maintains that institutional quality is decisive in how natural resource abundance affects 
economic growth, regardless of whether or not resource abundance affects institutional quality.  
However, most studies go one step further by claiming that resource abundance is a cause of poor 
institutional quality.  Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby (2005), Bulte, Damania, & Deacon 
(2005), Robinson, Torvik, & Veridier (2006), and Collier (2010) conclude that resource wealth 
weakens the quality of institutions.   
Poor institutional quality may appear in the forms of weak private property laws, rent 
seeking, corruption, conflict, low rates of entrepreneurship, poor governance, or low investment 
in growth-promoting activities.  The latter two are discussed separately below.  Many studies 
have found that the corrupting influence of resources on institutional quality and growth is 
especially strong in the case of point resources such as fuels and minerals, as opposed to non-
point, diffuse resources such as agricultural products (Auty, 1997, 2001; Woolcock, Pritchett, & 
Isham, 2001; Isham et al., 2005; Boschini, Pettersson, & Roine, 2007).  Collier (2010) concludes 
that resource revenue has a corrupting effect on institutions based on empirical evidence that 
democracy increases growth where natural resources are scarce, but has the opposite effect where 
they are abundant.  This result is supported by studies such as Acemoglu, Robinson, & Verdier 
(2003), which offers evidence that the high resource rents associated with natural resource 
endowments help dictators to maintain power.  Natural resource abundance, as measured by the 
extent of primary commodity exports in a country, is correlated with an increased risk of conflict, 
again particularly in the case of point resources (Collier, 2010; Ross, 2004).  Lastly, some studies 
find that entrepreneurial activities are crowded out both because of the wage premium and rent 
seeking opportunities provided by the natural resource sector (Sachs & Warner, 2001).   
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Second, a boom in the resource sector causes a persistent appreciation of both nominal and 
real exchange rates, causing the export sector to shrink, the “Dutch Disease” as described in 
Sachs & Warner (1995, 1997, and 2001).  The appreciation of the real exchange rate creates 
several effects which result in the contraction of the export sector: It increases input prices for the 
export sector; and it makes exported goods relatively more expensive for foreign consumers.  Van 
der Ploeg (2011) points out that the export sector also declines due to labor being drawn out of 
the sector and into the resource sector.  To the extent that a resource windfall causes “Dutch 
Disease”, and the exporting sector declines in employment, economic growth is hampered by a 
loss in learning by doing (van der Ploeg, 2011; Sachs & Warner, 1995).  This explanation relies 
on endogenous growth theories, and assumes that human capital spillover effects occur 
predominantly in exporting sectors.   
Third, because young people have a disincentive to continue their education when relatively 
well-paying unskilled resource-sector employment opportunities are available, there is a negative 
correlation between resource dependence and school enrollment (Gylfason, Herbertsson, and 
Zoega, 1999, Gylfason, 2001; Black et al., 2005a; van der Ploeg 2011).   Gylfason (2001) finds 
that expected years of schooling for girls and secondary school enrollment rates are both 
negatively related to the share of natural resource wealth across countries.  Black et al. (2005a) 
focus on the effects of the coal boom of the late 1970s to early 1980s (and the subsequent bust) in 
Appalachia and find that high school enrollment rates declined substantially during the boom 
period and increased during the bust period.  Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) find that schooling is 
the most important transmission channel in their resource curse study of the U.S. states. 
2.2.2 Resource Curse studies using sub-national data 
Very few previous studies have used sub-national data to address the resource curse 
question.  Michaels (2011) uses county-level data to investigate the effect of oil resources on a 
variety of measures, including personal income and employment density, and devotes much 
attention to the problem of sample selection.  In contrast to much of the rest of the empirical 
resource curse literature, he finds a positive effect of resource abundance on employment density 
and income growth, which he attributes to agglomeration economies.  His paper is also of special 
interest here because he attempts to limit heterogeneity by drawing his sample only from counties 
within 200 miles of an oil resource.   
James and Aadland (2011) found significant negative growth effects of resource abundance 
using a national cross section of 3092 counties over the 1980-1995 time period.  Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2007) also found a resource curse using state-level U.S. data (specifically, they 
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estimated that a one percent increase in resource abundance decreases growth by about .047 
percentage points).  These two studies use similar measures of resource abundance; James and 
Aadland (2011) use the percent of county earnings from agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining, 
while Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) use the percent of gross state product from agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, and mining.  There are also a few unpublished papers using sub-national data.  
They include dissertation chapters by Sen (2010), Corey (2008), and Dunn (2008), which employ 
U.S. data measured at the state and (in the case of Sen) county level.  All of these studies analyze 
the United States as a whole and define resource abundance broadly, whereas I focus on 
Appalachia and coal in order to identify the mechanism sharply.   
More recently, Marchand (2012) uses data from Western Canadian census divisions to 
investigate the impacts of the 1970’s energy price boom and subsequent bust in 1980’s, as well as 
the boom from 1996-2006 on employment and earnings.  For the energy extraction industry, 
Marchand (2012) finds positive direct impacts of the boom periods and only modest negative 
effects from the bust period.  In addition he finds positive spillover effects of the booms for non-
energy sectors, and divides non-energy sectors into “local goods” and “traded goods” to further 
analyze the effects of the booms and bust on employment and earnings.  The local goods sector 
included construction, retail, and services, and Marchand estimated that for every 10 energy 
extraction jobs created, there were 3 construction jobs, 2 retail jobs, and 4.5 service jobs created, 
but that these sectors experienced a loss in earnings per worker during the bust.  The traded goods 
sector was represented by manufacturing, and Marchand estimated positive effects on earnings 
not only from the boom (although smaller in magnitude than the effects on the local good sector), 
but also positive effects on earnings from the bust period as well. 
Most recently, Caselli and Michaels (2013) looks at the effect of oil resources in different 
regions of Brazil, and finds that increased revenue to municipalities from oil windfalls do not 
translate into a significant increase in public good provision or the population’s living standards.  
They also note the empirical advantages of using units of observations from within a country, and 
the resulting increase in the precision of estimates. 
2.3.3 Economic growth and natural resources in Appalachia   
Very few resource curse studies focus on the Appalachian region.  Santopietro (2002)  
discusses the role of natural resources in growth, but mainly focuses on income convergence, 
comparing 127 central Appalachian counties to 152 non-central Appalachian counties in the same 
three states (Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky) between 1969 and 1997 using cross sectional 
methods.  He tests for absolute convergence and finds that in terms of income levels, the central 
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Appalachian counties are only barely converging with the rest of the region, at a very low rate of 
.03 percent per year.  He argues that despite increases in productivity in coal mining during this 
time, natural resources have failed to help income levels in the region catch up to the surrounding 
area.  Santopietro (2002) also does not attempt to explain the mechanism by which natural 
resources might have hindered income growth in Appalachia. 
Deaton and Niman (2012) use county level panel data to examine poverty rates in 
Appalachia.  They model poverty rates as a function of industry composition, measured as the 
percent of the population employed in various sectors (mining, manufacturing, agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, construction, and services) and other controls.  Their data set covers 399 
Appalachian counties from 1960 to 1990, with three time periods each representing a decade.  
Deaton and Niman (2012) use county fixed-effect panel data estimation and find that an increase 
in the share of the population employed in the mining sector has an overall positive effect on the 
poverty rate.  Like Santopietro (2002), they do not attempt to account for the channels through 
which heavy employment in mining may be positively affecting the poverty rate. 
Black et al. (2005b) examine the effects of the coal market boom and bust during the late 
1970s to early 1980s in Appalachia on both the locally traded goods sector, and on the nationally 
traded goods sector.  They find evidence of spillover effects on employment in sectors with 
locally traded goods, but no evidence of any spillover effects in sectors with nationally traded 
goods.  In the locally traded goods market, they find asymmetric effects of the boom and bust, 
estimating that for each 10 jobs added in the coal sector during the boom, fewer than two jobs 
were added in the local goods sector, but during the bust, for each 10 jobs lost in the coal sector, 
3.5 jobs were lost in the local goods sectors.   
Black et al. (2005a) study the effect of the same coal boom and bust on high school 
enrollment rates in Kentucky and Pennsylvania.  They show that the boom in the late 1970s 
increased the earning of high school dropouts relative to those of graduates, and the bust 
decreased the earnings of dropouts relative to graduates.  Black et al. (2005a) also find that as a 
result, high school enrollment rates declined considerably in the 1970s during the coal market 
boom, and increased in the mid to late 1980s in coal-producing counties relative to counties 
without coal.  Their estimates imply that a ten percent increase in the earnings of low-skilled 
workers decreases high school enrollment rates by as much as five to seven percent, provided that 
the earnings increase is viewed as long term.   
In an unpublished dissertation, Harkness (2010) studied the resource curse and several of its 
theoretical channels including taxation, public investment in education, and corruption using 
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county-level data from Kentucky between 1980 and 2005.  In cross sectional regressions, 
Harkenss found no connection between the slower growth experienced by coal dependent 
counties and a measure of coal abundance or of coal extraction.  Harkness attributes the 
correlation between coal dependence and negative growth rates to geographical factors, such as 
geology and soil quality.  Harkness (2010) also finds no support for the existence of an 
educational spending channel, a low-taxation channel, or a corruption channel. Aside from these 
few papers, no others have examined the potential causal mechanisms for a resource curse in the 
Appalachia region that I am aware of. 
 
2.3 Measuring natural resource abundance versus dependence 
There is some debate in the literature about how to best measure resource abundance.  
Several researchers have questioned the typically employed measures of resource abundance in 
cross-country studies, including both the primary exports divided by a measure of national 
income, and the share of resource industries in national income.  Brunnschweiler (2008) cites 
several problems with export based measures, arguing that the existence of counter-examples of 
resource-rich countries such as Australia and Germany with relatively low proportions of primary 
exports indicate that natural resource abundance isn’t necessarily correlated with the share of 
natural resource exports.  Furthermore, she points out that it is possible for this measure to be 
biased due to reverse causation: a slow growth economy with a large share of natural recourse 
exports may result from poor policy.   
Brunnschweiler (2008) also criticizes the use of production related data as a measure of 
resource abundance, arguing that it is potentially endogenous since production is likely affected 
by the differing levels of technology across countries.  This is far less of a concern in the sample 
of 409 Appalachian counties given its relative cultural homogeneity.  Brunnschweiler (2008), 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), and Stijins (2005) argue that natural resource wealth should be 
measured on a per capita basis, and claim that such a variable measures resource abundance 
rather than resource dependence.  They advocate using World Bank indicators of per capita 
mineral wealth and per capita total natural resource wealth.
9
  Using these measures, 
Brunnschweiler (2008) finds a positive effect of natural resource abundance on growth across 84 
                                                 
9  The World Bank natural resource indicators value different components of natural wealth in U.S. Dollars per 
capita on the basis of the net present value of rents and are available for 1994 and 2000.  Natural resources valued by 
the World Bank in both studies include subsoil assets (fuel and nonfuel minerals), timber resources, non-timber forest 
resources, protected areas, cropland, pastureland, and total natural capital. 
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countries over the period 1970-2000, using OLS and 2SLS estimation methods on cross country 
data.     
Brunnschweiler’s positive result could be biased due to measurement error.  Collier (2010) 
provides several persuasive reasons to believe that the quantity of subsoil assets in non-OECD 
countries is likely vastly underreported in World Bank data.  First, if we assume that natural 
assets are randomly distributed geographically, then one would expect the law of large numbers 
to somewhat even out the distribution of natural assets across OECD and non-OECD countries.  
But according to the World Bank data, OECD countries have approximately four to five times 
more subsoil assets than most other non-OECD countries.  Secondly, subsoil assets are likely 
understated in the non-OECD countries since there has been far less exploratory drilling there.  
And finally, non-OECD countries have shorter extraction histories, which combined with the 
notion that they should have roughly the same amount of subsoil assets as OECD countries, leads 
to the assumption that more assets should be left in the ground in non-OECD countries, contrary 
to World Bank data (Collier 2010).  Another problem with using a per capita measure (if the aim 
is to measure ‘resource abundance’ over ‘resource dependence’) is that it is possible for large 
quantities of a resource to exist in a place that is sparsely populated.   
Furthermore, many of the studies that have found positive or neutral effects of natural 
resources employ measures based on potential resource wealth (Brunnschweiler, 2008; Stijns, 
2005).  Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) note that most economists define resource abundance as 
proven reserves plus already exploited resources versus potentially exploitable resources, which 
may or may not become economically exploitable.  The mere existence of resources in situ, or a 
pure abundance of resources, should affect growth mainly through the process of extraction, be 
those positive or negative effects.10  Therefore, it may be the case that resource dependence is of 
equal or greater importance than resource abundance when it comes to investigating the effects of 
resources on growth. 
I employ both a measure of resource dependence and resource abundance to estimate the 
effect of resources on long run income growth.  First, I use an indicator variable Coal0, equal to 
one if the county has ever produced any coal as of the initial year of the decade.  This dummy 
variable is likely exogenous because the Appalachian coal fields are mature: nearly all of the 
counties, including all of the major coal producing counties, initiated coal production before out 
sample period.  Only seven of 193 coal producing counties in the sample initiated production 
during the forty year period of study; in 1970, 186 counties had produced coal at some point in 
                                                 
10      Collier (2010) does however discuss problems related to the discovery process for natural resources. 
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the past.  By 1980, six new counties began production, bringing the total to 192.  That number 
remained constant in 1990 and by 2000 only one additional county began producing coal, for a 
total of 193 coal producing counties.  Because Coal0 primarily indicates the exogenous 
geographic presence of commercially minable coal in a county, it more likely represents a 
measure of pure resource abundance as opposed to a measure of resource dependence.  Table 1a 
shows the descriptive statistics for the Coal0 variable. 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Coal0 Variable 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1970 409 0.45 0.50 0 1.00 
1980 409 0.47 0.50 0 1.00 
1990 409 0.47 0.50 0 1.00 
2000 409 0.47 0.50 0 1.00 
If the goal is to measure resource dependence on the other hand, then a measure that takes 
account of the size of the resource sector relative to the overall local economy is needed.  The 
measure of resource dependence used here is NR, a continuous variable representing the ratio of 
resource revenue to pre-tax total personal income, net of government transfers.  I measure its 
numerator, resource revenue, as the number of tons of coal produced in county   during the initial 
year of the time period (in thousands), multiplied by the average real price of bituminous coal 
during the same year.  Its denominator is total personal income for county   during the same year, 
also in thousands.  This measure mirrors the most typically employed measure used in the 
international resource curse literature, resource revenue as a share of gross domestic product.  It 
addresses “’dependence” since it is a flow measure of the value of resources relative to the local 
economy. It is also a more appropriate measure than Coal0 for capturing the effects of potential 
transmission channels, since the transmission mechanisms of the resource curse largely arise from 
a dependence on resources, versus the mere existence of resources is situ.      
Table 1b shows descriptive statistics for the natural resource abundance variable (NR) for all 
409 counties in the left panel, and for only coal producing counties in the right panel.  “Coal 
producing counties” are defined as counties that produced a nonzero amount of coal during the 
initial year of the time period,          and all others are “non-coal counties.”  As shown in 
Table 1b, mean NR peaked in 1980 at 0.43, and has declined since.   In 1970 a total of 154 of the 
409 counties in the sample (38%) produced coal.  By 1990, this number dropped to 145 counties 
(35% of the sample), and by 2000, only 115 counties (28%) were producing coal, reflecting 
increasing depletion of the Appalachian coal reserves in some counties.  Although some counties 
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in Appalachia are experiencing an irreversible decline in production, other counties are 
experiencing stable or increasing production (Milici & Dennen 2009).11  In fact, 10 of these 
counties with stable or increasing production account for nearly half of all Appalachian coal 
produced in 2009.12 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for NR (Coal Revenue as a Share of Personal Income) 
 
All Counties Coal Counties 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1970 409 0.09 0.24 0 2.10 154 0.23 0.36 0.0001 2.10 
1980 409 0.16 0.42 0 4.00 153 0.43 0.60 0.0002 4.00 
1990 409 0.12 0.38 0 3.17 145 0.35 0.57 0.0002 3.17 
2000 409 0.07 0.29 0 2.52 115 0.25 0.50 0.00001 2.52 
 
2.4 Data and Empirical Models 
Per capita income growth differs substantially between coal and non-coal producing 
counties, and the relative performance of each group is associated with boom and bust cycles in 
energy markets (as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3).  During the energy boom of the mid to late 
1970’s, coal counties had an average growth rate about three quarters of a percentage point higher 
than non-coal counties.  During the energy bust and the industry retooling of the 1980’s, the trend 
more than reversed, with non-coal counties outperforming coal counties by about one and a third 
percentage points.  The 1990’s brought broad but moderate growth to both coal and non-coal 
counties.  During the most recent time period, which includes an energy boom beginning in 2004, 
coal counties have once again outperformed non-coal counties, by 0.70 percentage points 
annually, on average. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the inverse correlation between the real price of bituminous coal and 
the difference between mean incomes levels for coal producing counties and non-coal producing 
counties.  The higher the price of coal, the higher is per capita income in coal producing counties 
relative to non-coal producing counties.  Figure 2.2 also shows the spike in coal prices in the mid 
to late 1970’s, and the more recent rise in coal prices beginning in 2004. 
                                                 
11       Fourteen counties that are in irreversible decline include Fayette WV, Harrison WV, Marion WV, McDowell 
WV, Raleigh WV, Wyoming WV, Alleghany PA, Cambria PA, Clearfield PA, Fayette PA, Indiana PA, Somerset PA, 
Washington PA, and Westmoreland PA (Milici and Dennen 2009). 
12       Ten counties that yielded nearly half of all Appalachian coal produced in 2009 are Boone, WV, Kanawha WV, 
Logan WV, Mingo WV, Monongalia WV, Buchanan VA, Wise VA, Perry KY, Pike KY, and Greene PA (Milici and 
Dennen 2009). 
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Figure 2.2: Real Price of Bituminous Coal and Mean Growth of Real Per Capita Personal 
Income of Coal and Non-Coal Appalachian Counties 
 
Source: EIA, BEA, Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean Growth of Per Capita Personal Income of Coal and Non-Coal 
Appalachian Counties 
 
Source: BEA, Author’s calculations 
I first specify a panel model that checks for evidence of an effect of coal resources on 
income growth in the sample of 409 Appalachian counties, comparing coal dependent and non-
coal dependent counties.  I first use the Coal0 variable discussed in section four as a measure of 
resource abundance as follows:   
                                                                                  (2a) 
The model has four time periods which are each ten years long (1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-
2000, and 2000-2010).  The dependent variable is the average long-run growth rate (    ), 
measured as the difference in log per capita personal income (     ) divided by the length of the 
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period which is 10 years, or      
 
    
                  for county i in state s at time t.  
Personal income is measured pre-tax and net of government transfers.  The use of these specific 
time periods has several advantages.  First, they roughly coincide with the timing of recent boom 
and bust cycles in oil and other energy markets. Second, these time periods allow for variables 
from decennial censuses to be used as controls. 
The explanatory variable of interest in equation (2a) is          a dummy variable equal to 
one if the county ever produced coal at any point in the past, as of the initial year of the time 
period. The Coal0 variable is exogenous since is represents the geographic presence or absence of 
commercially minable coal in a county, and therefore I use OLS to estimate equation (2a).   I test 
the null hypothesis that resource abundance has no significant effect on income growth (       
 ) against the alternative hypothesis that resource abundance negatively affects growth (       
 ).  Rejection of the null hypothesis is evidence that resource abundance acts as a curse against 
growth in the sample of Appalachian counties, ceteris paraibus.  Descriptive statistics for Coal0 
are shown in Table 1a. 
Following the economic growth and convergence literature (Temple 1999), I model the 
average long-run growth rate of per capita income as a function of log real per capita personal 
income during the initial year of each time period, (     ).  A significantly negative coefficient 
on this term implies conditional convergence of incomes, or that counties with lower per capita 
incomes will grow faster, catching up to counties with higher incomes over time.  Evidence for 
convergence across U.S. counties is provided by Rappaport (1999), Higgins et al. (2006), and 
Young et al. (2008). 
The vector of control variables in equation (2a),    , includes three additional conditioning 
variables, two of which are dummy variables that control for rural isolation as well as urban 
stimulation.  These variables were derived from the USDA’s Rural-Urban Continuum (“Beale”) 
Codes, as shown in Appendix 6.  Beale Codes are available for 1974, 1983, 1993, and 2003, and 
are based primarily on data from the previous census, so I treat them as exogenous beginning-of-
period values for their respective decades.  Because they are non-monotonic, I use them to create 
rural and metro dummy variables (           ).  Given the location of the poorest counties in 
very rural areas, and the difficulties that geographical isolation makes for growth and commerce, 
I expect positive coefficients for metro area indicators and negative coefficients for rural 
indicators.  The time fixed effects vector    consists of T-1 dummy variables indicating the time 
period.  Their inclusion is standard in panel growth models, as they essentially transform each 
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variable into a difference from its cross-sectional mean as of time t.  Inclusion of these time fixed 
effects controls for the business cycle and other shocks common to all counties at a given time.   
The third variable in     is an interaction variable between the percent change in oil price 
over the time period,               and a dummy variable equal to one if county   produced coal 
during the initial year of the time period (     ).  This variable controls for the cyclical effects 
of boom and bust cycles due to price shocks in oil markets that have special effects on coal 
producing economies (Engemann, Owyang, & Wall, 2011).  Since World War II these boom and 
bust cycles have been driven by changes in energy prices, which can be measured by changes in 
oil prices.  Inclusion of this term allows the coefficient on the variable representing resource 
abundance to capture the non-cyclical, long-run effect of natural resource abundance.    
Equation (2a) contains a state fixed effect term,   , which accounts for state-specific effects 
on the county’s growth rate. These include characteristics such as income, severance, sales, and 
inheritance taxes, broad infrastructure and educational policy, the structure of the judicial system, 
much law enforcement (including environmental law enforcement), and corruption which are all 
strongly affected by statewide institutions.  A Hausman test ruled out the random effects model 
for all specifications.   
Next, I specify a panel model identical to equation (2a), but I instead use the NR variable 
discussed in section four to capture the effects of coal resources on the local economy: 
                                                                                            (2b) 
The NR variable constitutes a measure of resource dependence, or the size of the resource sector 
relative to the local economy.  It is the ratio of resource revenue to total personal income in 
county   during the initial year of the period, where resource revenue is estimated as the price of 
coal in year   multiplied by the number of thousands of tons of coal produced in county   during 
year  .  I set the NR variable to the initial year of each time period to help mitigate endogeneity, 
as is standard in growth literature.   I test the null hypothesis that resource abundance has no 
significant effect on income growth (        ) against the alternative hypothesis that resource 
abundance negatively affects growth (        ).  Rejection of the null hypothesis is evidence 
that coal resource dependence acts as a curse against growth in the sample of Appalachian 
counties, ceteris paraibus.  The descriptive statistics for NR are shown in Table 1b.   
The choice of estimation method for the growth regression equation (2b) depends on 
whether or not the NR variable can be treated as exogenous.  As Brunnschweiler (2008) points 
out, researchers often consider it to be exogenous despite reasons to believe otherwise.  The 
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numerator is a flow regressor, and is therefore likely to be simultaneously determined by 
economic growth (Caselli, Esquivel, & Lefort, 1996).  The denominator, total personal income of 
the county during the initial year, may also be endogenous given that the dependent variable is 
growth in personal income.  Testing confirms that the NR variable should be considered as 
endogenous in equation (2b), therefore I estimate the model with two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
in addition to OLS.    
The 2SLS method is consistent, given that the required conditions regarding the selection of 
instrumental variables are satisfied.  I attempt to isolate the exogenous component of NR with two 
instrumental variables.  The first is the Coal0 dummy variable previously described. It is equal to 
one if the county has ever produced any coal as of the initial year of the time period, thus 
indicating the presence or absence of commercially minable coal in a county.  Therefore, the 
Coal0 variable should only affect income growth through current and recent extraction, making it 
a valid instrument for NR.  The NR and Coal0 variables are also highly correlated, making Coal0 
a strong instrument as well.   
The second instrument I use for the NR variable is SlavePct1860, a continuous variable 
indicating the percent of the population that were slaves in 1860.  SlavePct1860 is a valid 
instrument since it is clearly predetermined relative to income growth from 1970 to 2010.  
SlavePct1860 could conceivably be correlated with the accumulation of assets over time resulting 
in higher income, but this is controlled for by the initial income variable.  In addition, the 
homogeneity of the sample mitigates the possibility of SlavePct1860 being correlated with 
omitted variables affecting growth.  The SlavePct1860 variable is also inversely correlated with 
the NR variable, as counties with more mining tend to be located in areas with more rugged 
landscapes, where plantations and slavery were uncommon.   
Lastly, there is also a concern over the endogeneity of the initial income variable,      .  
Initial income may be correlated with the NR measure of resource dependence through the 
denominator of NR, and therefore the estimation method should account for this possible 
endogeneity to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of NR on income growth.  Therefore, the 
initial income variable will be instrumented with lagged initial income.  The method of using 
lagged values for instruments for right-hand-side variables in growth regressions is a widely used 
practice in the economic growth literature; see Arellano Bond (1991) for example.   
In summary, I estimate the panel growth model with a measure of resource abundance, 
Coal0, represented by equation (2a), using OLS.  I next estimate the panel growth model with a 
measure of resource dependence, NR, represented by equation (2b), using both OLS and 2SLS.  I 
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conduct an additional 2SLS estimation using equation (2b) taking into account the possible 
endogeneity of initial income.  Lastly, I perform the estimations using a variety of alternative 
measures of resource abundance (shown in Table 2.7) to confirm the robustness of the results.  
Testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity so all estimations are performed with robust 
standard errors.  Table 2.3 contains variable descriptions and data sources, and Table 2.4 contains 
descriptive statistics for all variables and instruments used in the study.  All control variables are 
set to the initial year of the time period.  All prices are measured in constant year 2000 dollars.   
Table 2.3: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
git Average annual growth of real per capita person income BEA 
LnY(it) Beginning of period real per capita personal income BEA 
Metro County  =1 if Beale code ≤ 3 (Metro area) USDA 
Rural County 
 =1 if Beale code ≥ 7 (Very rural, or population  < 20,000, 
not adjacent to an urban county) 
USDA 
NRDum  =1 if NR ≠0, =0 if NR =0. EIA, USGS 
(dOil Price)*(NRDum) 
Interaction variable between the percent change in real oil 
price over the time period, and NRDum indicator variable 
EIA, USGS 
Coal0 
 =1 if county has ever produced coal as of initial year of 
period 
EIA, USGS 
NR 
Coal revenue (price*production) divided by total county 
personal income, during initial year of period 
EIA, USGS 
Year XXXX Year fixed effect 
 
SlavePct1860 
Percentage of population that were slaves according to 1860 
Census 
Census 
 
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
git 1636 0.009 0.013 -0.045 0.093 
LnY(it) 1636 9.493 0.304 8.322 10.463 
Metro County 1636 0.269 0.444 0 1 
Rural County 1636 0.438 0.496 0 1 
NRDum 1636 0.347 0.476 0 1 
(dOil Price)*(NRDum) 1636 0.127 0.626 -0.940 1.650 
Coal0 1636 0.466 0.499 0 1 
NR 1636 0.110 0.342 0 3.997 
SlavePct1860 1636 6.781 7.901 0 43.900 
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2.5 Results 
Table 2.5 shows the results of estimating equation (2a) on the sample of 409 Appalachian 
counties.  All estimations included state-level fixed effects and robust standard errors.  The 
estimated coefficient on the Coal0 variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
and equals -0.0040.  This estimate implies that the presence of commercially minable coal is 
associated with a reduction in average annual growth of about 0.40 percentage points.  
Table 2.5: Estimates of the effect of Coal Abundance on Economic Growth (Equation 2a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth in Real Per Capita Personal Income 1970-2010 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-2010), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  (1a) 
  OLS FE 
LnY(it-τ) -0.0194*** 
 
(0.0018) 
Metro County 0.0048*** 
 
(0.0009) 
Rural County -0.0008 
 
(0.0006) 
Year 1970 0.0067** 
 
(0.0028) 
Year 1980 0.0099*** 
 
(0.0025) 
Year 1990 0.0133*** 
 
(0.0024) 
dOilPrice*NRDum 0.0070*** 
 
(0.0016) 
Coal0 -0.0040** 
 
(0.0013) 
Constant 0.1852*** 
 
(0.0177) 
Observations 1636 
R-squared 0.41 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Over time, even small decreases in average annual income growth have a substantial impact 
on income levels.  For example, a drop in average annual income growth of 0.40 percentage 
points results in income levels being lowered by about 17 percent over forty years, with 
compounding.  Therefore, when comparing two Appalachian counties with a one unit difference 
in the resource abundance measure (but similar in other ways), one would expect that the county 
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with fewer resources would have experienced faster income growth and be about 17 percent 
richer over a forty year period, had it begun with a similar per capita income level.  
The potential difference in long run income levels can be illustrated with an example using 
two counties: Monroe County West Virginia, a county with no coal, and Buchanan County 
Virginia, a county that has been moderately reliant on coal mining throughout the study period.  
(Throughout the study period, Monroe had a NR value of 0 while Buchanan has an NR value of 
approximately 1.)   Monroe County began the 40 year study period in 1970 with a per capita 
income level about eighteen percent lower than that of Buchanan County.  But due to faster 
income growth in Monroe County over the long run, by the year 2000 Monroe County had an 
income level nearly six percent higher than that of Buchanan County.  After the most recent 
boom in coal prices from that began in 2004, income in Monroe County was one again lower than 
income in Buchanan County in 2010, but only by about seven percent.  Despite the recent boom 
in coal prices, Monroe was able to make much larger gains in income levels over the long run; it 
began with income levels far below Buchanan, and ended up with an income level much closer to 
Buchanan. 
Table 2.6 shows the results of estimating equation (2b) on the sample of 409 Appalachian 
counties.  All estimations included state-level fixed effects and robust standard errors.  The 
estimated coefficient on the NR variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for 
all estimations, and ranges from -0.0034 (OLS) to -0.0157 (2SLS).  The OLS estimates imply that 
a one unit increase in resource dependence results in a reduction in average annual growth of 
about 0.34 percentage points, while the 2SLS estimate implies a larger reduction of 
approximately1.5 percentage points.  A one unit increase in the resource variable represents is a 
relatively large increase in the NR measure; resource revenue relative to total personal income 
must double in order for the NR variable to increase by one unit.  It is therefore more logical to 
discuss the effect of a one standard deviation change in the NR variable, which is 0.50 for the coal 
producing counties in 2000.  A one standard deviation increase in the NR variable yields a 
reduction in average annual growth by an estimated 0.17 percentage points using the OLS 
estimate, and by an estimated 0.78 percentage points according to the 2SLS estimate with only 
NR as endogenous.  However, when the endogeneity of initial income (LnY) is also taken into 
account, the estimated coefficient on NR drops to -0.0086 but remains highly significant.  
According to this estimate, a one standard deviation increase in resource dependence reduces 
average annual growth by an estimated 0.43 percentage points. 
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Both the Hausman test and the endogeneity test indicate that the NR and the initial income 
variables should be treated as endogenous.  The variables Coal0 and SlavePct1860 were used as 
instruments for the NR variable in the 2SLS estimations in columns (2) and (3), and lagged initial 
income             was used as an instrument for initial income         in column (3).  If the 
equation is overidentified, (as is the case here since there are two endogenous variables and three 
excluded instrumental variables) then the second assumption, that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the residual, can be tested.  The null hypothesis of the Hansen J test is that the 
excluded instrumental variables are valid, or uncorrelated with the error term in equation (2b).  
As shown in Table 2.6, the p-value of the Hansen J test statistic for each of  the 2SLS estimations 
in columns (2) and (3) indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis of joint instrument validity. 
Table 2.6: Estimates of the effect of Coal Dependence on Economic Growth (Equation 2b) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth in Real Per Capita Personal Income 1970-2010 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-2010), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  (1b) (1b) (1b) 
  
OLS FE 
 
2SLS (NR 
endogenous) 
2SLS (NR, LnY 
endogenous) 
LnY(it) -0.0177*** -0.0188*** -0.0096*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0023) 
Metro County 0.0045*** 0.0040*** 0.0032*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Rural County -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0007 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Year 1970 0.0077** 0.0072*** 
 
 
(0.0028) (0.0011)  
Year 1980 0.0103*** 0.0110*** 0.0144*** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Year 1990 0.0134*** 0.0139*** 0.0154*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
doilprice*NRdum 0.0064*** 0.0065*** 0.0091*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
NR -0.0034*** -0.0157*** -0.0086*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0028) 
Constant 0.1676*** 
  
 
(0.0099) 
  Observations 1636 1636 1227 
R-squared 0.40  -   -  
Hansen J test  -  0.986 0.688 
 (P-Value)  -  (0.3208)   (0.4070) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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I test the first assumption, that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variable, 
using the Angrist-Pischke F test.  The null hypothesis of the Angrist-Pischke F test is that the 
endogenous variable is unidentified by the instruments.  For the estimation in column (2) of Table 
2.6 with only NR treated as endogenous, the Angrist-Pischke F statistic is 71.53 and significant at 
the one percent level, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis.  For the estimation in column 
(3) with both NR and LnY treated as endogenous, the Angrist-Pischke F statistic for the first stage 
estimation of NR is 51.48 and significant at the one percent level.  The Angrist-Pischke F statistic 
for the first stage estimation of LnY is 717.04 is also significant at the one percent level, also 
indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis.  In addition, each instrument is significantly 
correlated with its respective endogenous variable, and of the expected sign in the first stage 
results.   
The convergence hypothesis implies that a county with a lower level of initial per capita 
income will catch up to richer counties that have similar characteristics over time.  Consistent 
with a wide literature supporting conditional convergence of per capita income, the estimated 
coefficients on the log of initial per capita income are negative and significant at the 1% level in 
each specification in tables 5 and 6.  Following Higgins et al. (2006), the implied asymptotic rate 
of convergence (r) can be inferred from the coefficient for initial income using the formula   
         
   .  The estimated coefficient on the initial income variable when it is considered 
as exogenous is -0.0188, as shown in column (2).  But when initial income is considered 
endogenously and instrumented, the estimated coefficient decreases to -0.0096, as shown in 
column (3).  This makes little difference however in the calculation of the rate of conditional 
income convergence; it goes from 2.02% for the estimation in column (2) to 2.01% for the 
estimation in column (3).  These estimates imply that counties close the gap between their steady 
state balanced growth path and their initial level of income at a speed of 2.01 to 2.02 percent 
annually, all else equal.  This concurs with the typically reported 2% rate, and but is substantially 
lower than the rate of 6-8% found in Higgins et al. (2006) for all U.S. counties.  Higgins et al. 
(2006) did not measure convergence for the Appalachian region, but they did measure it for the 
southern states and estimated a rate of 11.49%. 
The estimated coefficients for the metro dummy were all positive and significant at the one 
percent level, as predicted, while the rural dummy variable was not significant in any of the 
specifications.  This implies that economies of agglomeration in urban areas positively influence 
income growth, while rural surroundings neither help nor inhibit income growth.  The year fixed 
effects were all significant at the one percent level in the 2SLS regressions, signifying the 
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presence of common period effects in real income growth.  The estimated coefficients for the 
interaction variable between the current coal production dummy and the change in oil price were 
also positive and significant at the one percent level in each regression, which implies that 
changes in the price of oil have a positive effect on income in coal producing areas.   
I used several alternative measures of resource intensity to test the robustness of the results.  
These measures are defined in Table 2.7, and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.8.  I 
used each of these variables in the growth regression and repeated the estimation using both OLS 
and 2SLS with the resource measure as endogenous.  The resulting estimates are shown in Table 
2.9.  The results are robust to any of the alternative measures.  For example, following James and 
Aadland (2011), I measure resource abundance as the share of total earnings in agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, and mining, and find a negative and significant coefficient of -0.0352, using 
2SLS.  Per capita based measures of resource intensity, such as coal revenue divided by 
population (NR2), coal production divided by population (NR5), and cumulative coal production 
divided by population (NR7) all yield negative and statistically significant and economically 
significant coefficients.  As previously stated, some researchers argue for the use of per capita 
measures, but here the distinction makes no difference to the qualitative results.  Area may be an 
alternative way to exogenously scale the measure of resource intensity.  Coal revenue divided by 
area (NR3), coal production divided by area (NR6), and cumulative coal production divided by 
area (NR8) all yield negative and statistically significant coefficients as well. 
Table 2.7: Alternative Measure of Coal Abundance 
Variable Description 
AFFM_Share  
Earnings from agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining divided by 
total earnings  
NR2=(Price*Prod)/Pop Coal revenue (price*production) divided by total county population  
NR3=(Price*Prod)/Area 
Coal revenue (price*production) divided by total county area 
(square km.)  
NR4=(Prod)/PI Coal production divided by total county personal income  
NR5=(Prod)/Pop Coal production divided by total county population  
NR6=(Prod)/Area Coal production divided by total county area  
NR7=(Cumul.Prod)/Pop Cumulative coal production divided by total county population  
NR8=(Cumul.Prod)/Area Cumulative coal production divided by total county area  
* All variables measured during initial year of period 
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Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Measure of Coal Abundance 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AFFM_Share  3325 0.036 0.085 0 0.856 
NR2=(Price*Prod)/Pop 4276 0.525 2.694 0 58.1 
NR3=(Price*Prod)/Area 4276 14.1 69.4 0 1351.8 
NR4=(Prod)/PI 4276 0.001 0.006 0 0.093 
NR5=(Prod)/Pop 4276 0.014 0.071 0 1.250 
NR6=(Prod)/Area 4276 0.367 1.780 0 28.610 
NR7=(Cumul.Prod)/Pop 4276 0.694 3.067 0 48.537 
NR8=(Cumul.Prod)/Area 4276 21.1 90.5 0 1137.2 
 
Table 2.9: Estimates of the effect of Coal Dependence on Economic Growth using 
Alternative Measures of Coal Abundance 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth in Real Per Capita Personal Income 1970-2010 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-2010), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  (1b) (1b) 
  OLS FE 2SLS (NR endog) 
AFFM_Share  -0.0157***  -0.0352***  
NR2=(Price*Prod)/Pop -0.0003***  -0.0013***  
NR3=(Price*Prod)/Area -0.00001**  -0.00004*** 
NR4=(Prod)/PI -0.0374***  -0.06732***  
NR5=(Prod)/Pop -0.0064**  -0.0567***  
NR6=(Prod)/Area -0.0003 -0.0019***  
NR7=(Cumul.Prod)/Pop -0.0001** -0.0013***  
NR8=(Cumul.Prod)/Area -0.0000 -0.00004***  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
2.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The primary merit of this analysis is that regions within the United States do not differ in 
dimensions such as language, institutional quality, and cultural attributes that are extremely 
difficult to control for in growth regressions, and therefore provide more precise estimates of the 
effect of resource abundance on growth.  I choose a sample of counties based on exogenous 
criteria, as opposed to using the set of counties defined by the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, which present endogeneity concerns for the purposes of studying income growth.  
By comparing counties with varying sized coal industries, I look for evidence of a resource curse 
in the Appalachian region using 40 years of economic performance.  I account for the possible 
endogeneity of the measure of resource abundance by using instrumental variable techniques.  I 
find evidence that resource abundance does in fact act as a curse on growth in the sample of 
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Appalachian counties.  This paper has contributed to the strand of resource curse literature that 
shows that the resource curse is not restricted to developing nations.   
Although the results of this study are derived from a specific regional context, they may be 
generalized with caution, and thus provide some guidance for policy.  The broad implication of 
the results is that there is no empirical support for subsidizing resource extraction on basis of 
promoting economic growth.  In addition, policy makers should consider the indirect costs of 
resource extraction that often arise because of boom and bust cycles in resource markets over the 
long run.  Although a boom clearly provides tangible benefits in the short run, a bust in the 
market can have even larger negative effects over the long run.  A common policy 
recommendation is the creation of a permanent trust fund, financed by  severance taxes, that 
could be used to promote economic development by investing productively, thus compensating 
future generations for the loss of the resource.  This approach is used by Norway and advocated 
by the International Monetary Fund when advising low-income countries.     
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Chapter 3 
An Empirical Investigation of the Resource Curse Channels in Appalachia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Given evidence that growth is systematically lower for counties in the Appalachian 
region where coal dominates the local economy, I next investigate which channels are responsible 
for this effect.  However, data on the county level is simply not available to fully assess each 
potential channel.  For example, measures of rent seeking, corruption, and institutional quality on 
the county level are almost non-existent.  Therefore, I limit this investigation to exploring several 
questions inspired by the resource curse literature for which data are available.   
First, I explore the educational attainment channel and find evidence that educational 
attainment, as measured by either high school completion or college degree attainment, plays a 
significant role in this negative effect of coal abundance on income growth.  A one standard 
deviation increase in coal abundance reduces average annual income growth through a reduction 
in high school completion by approximately 0.12 percentage points, while the college degree 
attainment measure implies a smaller reduction in average annual income growth of 
approximately 0.03 percentage points. Second, I study educational spending on the county level 
and find no evidence of any effects of coal resources.  Third, I investigate the idea of Ross (2001) 
and Collier (2010) that resource abundance areas tend to under-tax the local population.  I find 
that resource abundance is positively correlated with taxation, although the effect is not 
economically significant. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 studies the educational 
attainment channel.  Section 3.3 investigates the effects of coal resources on county level 
educational spending.  Section 3.4 investigates the effects of coal resources on county level 
taxation decisions, as measured by total county tax revenue per capita, and county property tax 
revenue per capita.  Section 3.5 concludes and summarizes the results. 
 
3.2 Educational Attainment Channel 
I first study the educational attainment channel by examining how high school and college 
degree attainment are affected by coal abundance in Appalachia, and how educational attainment 
affects income growth. There is at least one theoretical reason why resource abundance may 
decrease the amount of education obtained by a local population.  Many jobs in natural resource 
sectors do not require a high level of education.  Thus as the natural resource sector expands 
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relative to other sectors, wages of uneducated workers rise, and as a result the wage gap between 
educated and uneducated workers decreases, decreasing the expected long run benefits of 
education.  At the same time, as wages of uneducated workers rise, the opportunity cost of 
obtaining an additional year of schooling rises as well, due to higher foregone earnings in the 
resource sector.  Human capital theory predicts that an increase in the wages of uneducated 
workers relative to educated workers will reduce the incentive to invest in additional schooling, 
particularly if workers perceive the increase to be permanent (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1964).   
Black et al. (2005a) provide empirical support for this theory in the context of Appalachian 
coal mining during the 1970s to mid 1980s, and argue that workers perceived changes in the coal 
market during this period to be permanent, because it was a relatively long-term shock.  They 
estimate that a 10% increase in earnings of low skilled workers during this boom period 
consequently decreased high school enrollment by about 5-7%.  The analysis here extends that of 
Black et al. (2005a) in several important ways.  First, I examine the long run effects of boom and 
bust cycles in the coal market on educational attainment, versus examining the effects of one 
specific shock.  Second, I explore whether or not the reduction in the fraction of individuals 
completing high school has any discernible effect on economic growth.  Lastly, I examine the 
same effects related to college degree attainment in addition. 
If these changes in the relative wage between educated and uneducated workers remain 
constant over time, then the benefits to uneducated workers are never reversed.  However, given 
the commonly observed long run volatility of prices in natural resource markets, it is possible that 
downturns in the market for the resource eventually depress the wages of uneducated workers 
relative to educated workers once again.  Black et al. (2005a) also provides evidence of this 
situation occurring during the mid 1980s decline of the coal market in Appalachia.  Downturns in 
the market may arise from a negative supply shock, such as depletion, a positive supply shock, 
such as new discoveries in other regions, or changes in the price of related goods, such as oil.  
After a decline in the market for a natural resource, the population may be left with a lower level 
of human capital than they would have otherwise, without the resource. 
Both theory and evidence suggest that human capital is an important determinant for 
economic growth.   The theoretical macro growth literature describes three mechanisms by which 
education can positively influence economic growth.  The first mechanism is increased labor 
productivity which results in higher equilibrium output.  This is exemplified in neoclassical 
growth models.  The second mechanism is the increased ability to create new technologies, (as in 
endogenous growth theories), and the third is the increased ability to implement new technologies 
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and transmit knowledge.  A wide empirical literature supports the importance of human capital to 
economic growth, especially human capital obtained through education, beginning with Barro 
(1991), and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  Earlier empirical studies that estimated the effect 
of education on growth often used ‘years of schooling’ and enrollment rates as measures of 
human capital.  Later studies such as Topel (1999), Barro and Lee (2000), and Krueger and 
Lindahl (2001) instead used measures of educational attainment to measure human capital, and 
also found evidence of positive effects on economic growth.    
Education levels are high and rising in the United States, but the Appalachian region lags far 
behind the national average in terms of both high school completion and college degree 
attainment.  Within the region educational attainment in coal mining counties lags slightly behind 
that of non-coal mining counties.  Figure 3.1 shows that in the initial year of each decade, the 
mean share of residents without a high school diploma was higher in coal counties versus non-
coal counties, with the widest margin occurring in 1990, after the 1980’s decline in the coal 
market. 
Figure 3.1: Mean Share of Population without a High School Diploma, by Year 
 
Figure 3.2 shows in the initial year of each decade, the mean proportion of residents with a 
college degree is higher for non-coal counties than for coal counties.  In the year 2000, only about 
11.5 percent of adults in coal counties and about 14 percent of adults in non-coal counties had a 
bachelor’s degree or higher (compared to a national average of 24 percent).  The most recent 
Census Bureau report currently available indicates that as of 2011, only 17.5 percent of adult 
West Virginians have earned a college degree or higher, compared to the national average of 30 
percent, making West Virginia the state with the lowest proportion of college educated residents 
in the nation. 
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Figure 3.2: Mean Share of Population with a Bachelor’s Degree or Higher, by Year 
 
3.3.1 Educational Attainment Model 
The resource curse literature has used several methods for exploring the channels through 
which the resource curse operates.  Many cross-sectional resource curse studies such as Sachs and 
Warner (1997, 2001) simply add appropriate channel control variables to the right hand side of a 
growth regression.  This method raises concerns of endogeneity since some channel control 
variables, for example education and intuitional quality, are likely not exogenous in a growth 
regression.  Several papers in the literature such as Gylfason (2001), Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004), and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) use a simultaneous equation framework which allows 
for the channel variable to be treated endogenously.  A simultaneous equation model (SEM) is 
appropriate because our prime explanatory variable, natural resource abundance, theoretically 
influences our dependent variable, economic growth, indirectly through the channel variable. I 
study the educational channel by formulating an SEM panel in which educational attainment 
affects the average growth rate of income in a county, while simultaneously being influenced by 
the presence of local natural resources, as shown below by equations (3.1) and (3.2): 
                                                                                           (3.1)     
                                                                  (3.2)                                                                                                                        
This SEM model covers the same time-frame (1970-2010) with the same four time periods 
of growth (1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000, and 2000-2010).  Equation (3.1) represents a structural 
growth equation, and is identical to the growth regression in equation (2b), but augmented with a 
term for educational attainment.  Equation (3.2) represents a structural form equation for 
educational attainment.  Educational attainment is measured by two different variables, both from 
the decennial Census.  The first is the share of adults age 25 and over without a high school 
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diploma (DropOut), and the second is the share of adults age 25 and over with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher (Bach+), both measured in the initial year of the time period.   
The indirect effect of resource abundance on economic growth via educational attainment 
is equal to the coefficient on the resource variable in the education equation      multiplied by 
the coefficient on education variable in the growth equation     .  In the model, if  the effect of 
DropOut on growth is negative (    ) and if the effect of coal resources on DropOut, is 
positive (     , then this would provide evidence that coal resources reduce growth by 
reducing the amount of people who graduate from high school.  Using the Bach+ measure 
instead, if  the effect of Bach on growth is positive and significant (     ) and if the effect of 
coal resources on Bach is negative and significant (     , then coal resources reduce growth 
through reducing the amount of residents who obtain a college degree.  Given theoretical 
explanations of the positive effect of education on growth, and the associated empirical evidence, 
I expect a positive and significant coefficient on the Bach+ variable and a negative and 
significant coefficient on the DropOut variable in equation (3.1). 
Both measures of educational attainment are treated as endogenous variables in equation 
(3.1), given the likely reverse causal relationship between economic growth and education: 
regions with higher stocks of human capital typically grow faster, while increased income growth 
often leads to higher levels of investment in human capital (Bils & Klenow, 2000; Goetz & Hu, 
1996).  Resource abundance is once again treated as an endogenous variable in the growth 
regression, for the same reasons previously discussed.  Therefore, instrumental variables for coal 
resources and for educational attainment are required to obtain consistent estimates for equation 
(3.1).  The instruments for resource abundance in equation (3.1) are the same as for the first 
model: Coal0 (a dummy equal to one if the county every produced coal commercially, as of the 
initial year of each period) and SlavePct1860 (the percentage of the population enslaved in 1860). 
To select instruments for educational attainment, I draw on past literature that 
investigates the causal link between education and earnings.  Several studies including Card 
(1993), Uusitalo & Conneelly (1998), and Kane & Rouse (1995) use geographic differences in 
the accessibility of college to isolate exogenous variation in educational decisions relative to 
earnings, while Maluccio (1998) uses distance to nearest high school.  Currie & Moretti (2003 
QJE) use the availability of colleges in the woman’s country as an instrument for maternal 
education in order to account for the endogeneity of educational attainment.  Their study 
investigates the causal link between maternal education and birth outcomes.  Card (2001) claims 
that the use of supply side variables (e.g. college proximity) to identify demand-side parameters is 
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“a cornerstone of structural econometric methodology” (p.1157).  The use of college proximity as 
an exogenous source of variation in educational choices in the context of average income growth 
relies on the assumption that college proximity affects income growth only through its effect on 
educational attainment.  In other words, we must assume that counties with universities grow 
faster not because more residents are employed in the education sector, but because there is more 
human capital in those counties. 
I use a proxy variable for college proximity as an exogenous instrument for educational 
attainment, EmplEdu, which is the fraction of the workforce employed in educational services, 
and gathered by the U.S. Census.  This variable includes both private and public employment, as 
well as employment in K-12, community colleges, and four year colleges and universities, and is 
therefore representative of college proximity.  A host of studies have shown that college 
proximity is strongly positively correlated with educational attainment choices, confirming that 
college proximity is a strong instrument (Card, 1993; Uusitalo & Conneelly, 1997; Kane & 
Rouse, 1995; Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Currie and Moretti, 2003).  Card (1993) finds that 
college proximity has a strong effect on completed education even after controlling for parental 
education, region, and IQ.  Proximity to school reduces the costs of schooling, and thereby 
positively affects an individual’s decision to obtain additional schooling, all else equal. 
To select variables for the model of educational attainment in equation (3.2), I draw on 
past literature that investigates the determinants of educational attainment, most of which are 
based on individual level survey data.  For example, Cameron and Heckman (1993) found that 
factors such as gender, sibling numbers, parents’ education, and family income influence the 
probability of entering college.  At the aggregated level of counties, such variables are not 
feasible for inclusion in the model.  Other studies have found that unemployment rates, average 
wage rates, and city size influence college degree attainment (Cohn and Hughes, 1994).   The 
influence of urban areas will be accounted for by the Rural and Metro dummies, which are 
included in the vector of exogenous variables     in equation (3.1), and thus serve as included 
instruments.  Initial income level (LnY) is also a determinant of college attendance (Cameron and 
Heckman (1993) that is included in equation (3.1) and thus serves as an included instrument in 
the SEM model.  The EmplEdu variable is included to account for college proximity, as discussed 
above, and serves as an excluded instrument in the system.   
The variable of prime interest in equation (3.2) is the coal natural resource variable, NR.  
It is set to the initial year of the 10 year period.  A positive and significant coefficient on this 
variable provides evidence that coal resources decrease educational attainment.  I have outlined 
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the theoretical reason why one may expect this outcome, especially given the low educational 
requirements for coal miners in recent history and the existence of market booms which alter the 
relative wage of uneducated workers.   
The state fixed effect term controls for any state specific factors affecting educational 
attainment that are constant over time.  State fixed effects were chosen over county fixed effects 
since many policies, laws, and institutions related to education occur at the state level.  The time 
fixed effect term controls for any long term trends in educational attainment that are common to 
all counties.  Descriptions of all variable are shown in Appendix 1, and descriptive statistics for 
all variables are shown in Appendix 2. 
First, equation (3.1) is estimated with OLS, ignoring the endogeneity of resource 
abundance and educational attainment.  Next, I estimate equation (3.1) with 2SLS with Coal0 and 
SlavePct1860 serving as excluded instruments for resource abundance, and EmplEdu serving as 
an excluded instrument for educational attainment, and I estimate equation (3.2) with OLS.  This 
estimation assumes that the NR variable in equation (3.2) is exogenous, which is a reasonable 
assumption.  In addition, I estimate both equations (3.1) and (3.2) with 3SLS.  The 3SLS method 
uses generalized least squares (GLS) to account for the likely correlation of disturbances across 
equations.  The 3SLS method also allows me to relax the assumption that NR is exogenous in 
equation (3.2), since it is treated as an endogenous variable in the system estimation.  All 
estimations use robust standard errors given that testing indicates the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
3.3.2 Education Attainment Model Results 
The results for equation (3.1) are shown in Table 3.1, and the results for equation (3.2) 
are shown in Table 3.2.  The left hand panel in each table shows the results using the DropOut 
measure of educational attainment, and the right side shows the results using the Bach+ measure.  
The combined results in tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide support for the existence of an educational 
attainment channel through which coal resources hinder long-run growth in the sample of 409 
Appalachian counties.  The estimates for equation (3.1) show that educational attainment 
significantly and positively affect growth, while the estimates for equation (3.2) show that 
resource abundance significantly and negatively affects educational attainment. 
Table 3.1 shows that the estimated coefficient for both measures of educational 
attainment in equation (3.1) are of the expected sign and are highly significant.  The share of 
residents without a high school diploma is associated with lower income growth, with a 2SLS 
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coefficient estimate of -0.0620, implying that a one unit increase in the share of the population 
that drops out of high school lowers growth by about .06 percentage points annually.  The share 
of residents with a college degree exerts a positive effect on income growth, with a 2SLS 
coefficient estimate of 0.0455, implying positive influence on growth of approximately .04 
percentage points annually with a unit increase in this measure. 
If reduced educational attainment is a channel through which resources lower growth, 
adding a control for education to the growth regression, as in equation (3.1), implies that the 
negative coefficient on resource abundance should fall.  Table 3.1 shows that the coefficient on 
coal abundance falls, but remains negative and significant in each specification, suggesting that 
although educational attainment is important, other channels in are important as well.  The 
addition of either measure of educational attainment to the growth regression produces a drop in 
the coefficient for the coal abundance term, but the drop is much larger for the DropOut measure 
(11%) than for the Bach+ measure (3%), using 2SLS coefficients. 
The estimates for equation (3.2) indicate that resource abundance significantly and 
negatively affects educational attainment.  When human capital accumulation is measured by 
Bach+, the estimated 2SLS coefficient implies that the share of residents that obtain a college 
degree is reduced by approximately 1.6 percent over a forty year period.  When human capital 
accumulation is measured by DropOut, the estimated 2SLS coefficient implies that the share of 
residents that don’t complete high school is increased by about 4 percent.  The 3SLS estimate of 
the effect of resource abundance is nearly identical for the DropOut measure, but is larger when 
using the Bach+ measure; signifying a reduction in the share of residents that obtain a college 
degree by approximately 2.8 percent.  All of the estimated coefficients for the coal abundance 
term are significant at the one percent level.  
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Table 3.1:  Estimates of the effect of Coal Abundance and Educational Attainment on Economic Growth (Equation 3.1) 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Growth Rates of Per Capita Personal Income 1970-2010 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-20010), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  Equation 3.1 with DropOut Equation 3.1with Bach+ 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS FE 2SLS 3SLS OLS FE 2SLS 3SLS 
LnY(it) -0.0249*** -0.0332*** -0.0279*** -0.0232*** -0.0231*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0018) 
Metro County 0.0042*** 0.0033*** 0.0036*** 0.0040*** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Rural County -0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (.0007) 
Year 1970 0.0156*** 0.0228*** 0.0172*** 0.0097*** 0.0088*** 0.0083*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.001) 
Year 1980 0.0146*** 0.0195*** 0.0165*** 0.0110*** 0.0116*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Year 1990 0.0159*** 0.0187*** 0.0170*** 0.0137*** 0.0141*** 0.0140*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
doilprice*NRdum 0.0063*** 0.0062*** 0.0064*** 0.0062*** 0.0063*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
NR -0.0024** -0.0142*** -0.0148*** -0.0031*** -0.0155*** -0.0156*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
DropOut -0.0313** -0.0620*** -0.0395***   
   (0.0128) (0.0166) (0.0133)     
Bach+ 
  
  0.0581*** 0.0455*** 0.0296*** 
   (0.0061) (0.012) (0.0095) 
Constant 0.2465*** 
 
0.2797*** 0.2137*** 
 
0.2029*** 
  (0.0322)   (0.0378) (0.0156)   (0.0167) 
Observations 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 
R-squared 0.41 
 
  0.43 
  Hansen J test   0.614     0.632   
Ho: IV's are exogenous.     (0.4332)       (0.4267)   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.2:  Estimates of the effect of Coal Abundance on Educational Attainment (Equation 3.2) 
Dependent Variable: Stock of Educational Attainment during Initial Year of Period 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-20010), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  Equation 3.2 with DropOut Equation 3.2 with Bach+ 
  (2) (3) (2) (3) 
  OLS FE 3SLS OLS FE 3SLS 
LnY(it-τ) -0.2515*** -0.2513*** 0.1233*** 0.1223*** 
 
(0.0142) (0.0060) (0.0144) (0.0035) 
Metro County -0.0103* -0.0102*** 0.0085*** 0.0080*** 
 
(0.0049) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0017) 
Rural County 0.0087* 0.0087*** 0.0024 0.0026 
 
(0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0016) 
Year 1970 0.2364*** 0.2364*** -0.0133** -0.0137*** 
 
(0.0081) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0023) 
Year 1980 0.1331*** 0.1330*** -0.0060* -0.0053*** 
 
(0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0020) 
Year 1990 0.0713*** 0.0712*** 0.0050*** 0.0054*** 
 
(0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0018) 
N.R.  0.0402*** 0.0421*** -0.0161*** -0.0279*** 
 
(0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0024) (0.0063) 
EmpEdu -0.5837*** -0.5839*** 0.7835*** 0.7851*** 
 
(0.0576) (0.0334) (0.0383) (0.0190) 
Constant 2.7733*** 2.8021*** -1.1375*** -1.1262*** 
 
(0.1396) (0.0592) (0.1402) (0.0342) 
Observations 1636 1636 1636 1636 
R-squared 0.92   0.77   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 3.3 summarizes the resulting 2SLS and 3SLS estimates of the indirect effect of resource 
abundance on growth via educational attainment.  Using the DropOut measure of attainment, the 2SLS 
indirect effect of resource abundance via educational attainment is the product of the estimated coefficient 
on Edu in the growth regression       -0.0620) multiplied by the estimated coefficient on NR in the 
education equation     = 0.0402), which equals -0.0025.  Using the Bach+ measure of education, the 
estimated 2SLS coefficient on Edu in the growth regression      0.0455) multiplied by the estimated 
coefficient on NR in the education equation     = -0.0161), equals -0.0007.  These estimates imply that a 
one unit increase in coal abundance reduces average annual income growth through a reduction in high 
school completion by approximately 0.25 percentage points.  When education is measured by college 
degree attainment, the estimates imply a reduction in average annual income growth of approximately 
0.07 percentage points.  In terms of standard deviations, the estimates imply that a one standard deviation 
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increase in coal abundance reduces average annual income growth through a reduction in high school 
completion by approximately 0.125 percentage points, while the college degree attainment measure 
implies a reduction in average annual income growth of approximately 0.037 percentage points.     
Table 3.3:  Estimates of the Indirect Effect of Coal Abundance on Education 
          
Indirect effect on growth: 
  
One Unit Increase in NR: One Std. Dev Increase in NR: 
DropOut 
2SLS -0.0025  -0.25 percentage points  -0.125 percentage points 
3SLS -0.0017  -0.17 percentage points  -0.083 percentage points 
Bach+ 
2SLS -0.0007  -0.07 percentage points  -0.037 percentage points 
3SLS -0.0008  -0.08 percentage points  -0.041 percentage points 
The 3SLS estimates yield similar sized estimates, especially for the Bach+ measure of 
attainment.  For the Bach+ measure of attainment, the estimated indirect effect based on the 3SLS 
estimation is that  a one standard deviation increase in coal abundance reduces average annual income 
growth by 0.041 percentage points (versus 0.037 percentage points per the 2SLS method).  But for the 
DropOut measure of attainment, the estimated indirect effect based on the 3SLS estimation is about one 
third smaller in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase in coal abundance reduces average annual 
income growth through by 0.083 percentage points (versus 0.125 percentage points per the 2SLS 
method).  For the 3SLS estimations, the standard error of         for DropOut is 0.0007 and for Bach+ 
it is 0.0004. 
The results indicate that the overall indirect (and negative) effect of coal resources on growth 
through reduced educational attainment is larger when measured by DropOut than by Bach+.  The 
estimated effect of each of these measures on growth is similar in magnitude, but the estimated effect of 
resource abundance on DropOut is much larger than the effect on Bach+, according to both the 2SLS and 
3SLS results.  This result is not surprising given that the coal industry typically did not require high 
school diplomas to work in coal mines during most of the study period.  Since a (public) high school 
education is free unlike a college education, the opportunity costs of attending high school represent the 
main source of costs.  Therefore, the change in opportunity cost for additional years of education impacts 
individuals in high school to a larger degree.  Also, Black (2005a) notes that individuals were likely to 
perceive the boom in the coal market in the late 1970s as a relatively long term change.  Therefore, the 
individual’s expected discounted benefits of completing high school (or college) were lowered. 
Tests confirm the joint endogeneity of the natural resource and educational attainment variables 
in equation (3.1), and thus the need for instruments.  Table 3.3 shows the results of the Hansen J test of 
instrument exogeneity for the 2SLS estimations.  The Hansen J statistic has a p-value of 0.4332 for the 
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DropOut measure, and 0.4267 for the Bach+ measure of attainment, each indicating a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of instrument exogoeneity.   Appendix 5 shows the 2SLS first stage results for both 
measures of educational attainment, including the Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic and associated p-
value. The p-value of the Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic is 0.0000 for both measures of educational 
attainment, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis.  In addition, for both measures educational 
attainment, the coefficients on the instrument EmplEdu are highly significant and have the expected sign. 
In summary, the combined results from tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide evidence that coal producing 
counties have lower levels of human capital due to the abundance of coal, and those lower levels of 
human capital in turn harm per capita income growth over the long run.  These results are consistent with 
Gylfason et al. (1999), Gylfason (2001), Black et al. (2005a), and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), which 
all find a negative effect of resource abundance on schooling.  Relatively high paying jobs in the resource 
sector increase the opportunity cost of schooling and decrease the expected discounted benefits of 
schooling, or the wage gap between uneducated and educated workers.  The benefits of foregoing 
additional education may be short-lived, as the local resource could be depleted; boom and bust cycles 
may occur; and increased mechanization within the mining industry may all negatively impact 
employment and earning prospects over the longer term. 
 
3.3 The Educational Spending Channel 
Much of the resource curse literature in political science emphasizes ‘weak governance’ as key cause 
of the resource curse (Ross, 2001; Collier, 2010).  Collier (2010) claims that the resource curse is 
confined to countries with weak governance.  Boom and bust cycles and the depletion of natural resources 
can have important implications for governments’ management of resource revenues.  One often cited 
example of ‘weak governance’ is the failure of governments to invest in growth promoting activities, 
especially education.  But like individuals, governments have less incentive to invest in education in the 
presence of a relatively high paying resource sector.  Governments may be lured into a false sense of 
security during a resource boom, and fail to make wise decisions that promote future growth, including 
investment in education.  Empirical evidence has shown that public expenditure on education relative to 
national income is generally lower in countries with an abundance of natural resources (Glyfason, 2001).  
The question is whether or not this impact occurs on the local level as well.  Two unpublished 
dissertations have examined this question.  Dunn (2008) used U.S. state level data and found that an 
increase in resource intensity is associated with a reduction in expenditure per pupil.  In contrast, 
Harkness (2010) found that coal counties in Kentucky actually invest more in education than non-coal 
counties. 
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Governments typically play a large role in human capital accumulation by allocating tax revenue for 
schooling.  However, empirical evidence for the effects of public educational expenditures on economic 
growth is mixed.  Cullison (1993), Zhang and Casagrande (1998), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), and 
Blankenau et al. (2007) all find a positive relationship between government education spending and 
growth.  Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find this relationship holds only for certain specifications.  Levine 
and Renelt (1992) find that government education expenditures are not a robust correlate of with growth 
rates.   Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) even find negative correlations between the share education 
expenditures in government budget and economic growth in most of their estimates.  
Education funding in the United States is primarily the responsibility of the state and local 
governments.  Across the U.S., the average share of education funding from state governments is about 
46% and the average share from local governments is about 37%.
13
  State and local laws pertaining to 
education funding vary widely.  For example, in some states, including Maryland, Tennessee, and 
Virginia, the county government is the primary provider of public education. In other states such as West 
Virginia and Kentucky, a mandated percentage of local property taxes (90% in West Virginia) are 
submitted to the state, which uses a formula process to redistribute funds for education to each county.  
For such states, the state is the primary provider of educational funding, but each county may also 
independently levy an additional property tax specifically for school funding which stays in the county.  
Mean EduExpShare for coal and non-coal counties are shown in Table 3.5.  Non-coal counties have 
substantially higher educational expenditure shares than coal counties for all years shown.  However, the 
coal counties are disproportionately located in states where the state-level government is the primary 
provider of education, such as West Virginia and Kentucky, and these counties tend to devote less of their 
local budgets to education.  Likewise, many non-coal counties are located in states such as Maryland, 
Tennessee, and Virginia where the county is the primary funder of education, and these states tend to 
devote larger percentage of local funds to education. 
Table 3.4:  Mean Education Expenditure Share, by Year 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
Non-coal Counties 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23 
Coal Counties 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08 
 
3.3.1 Educational Spending Channel Model 
I specify the following equation to investigate the effect of coal abundance on county level 
educational spending: 
                                                 
13  Data from 2004-2005, from http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html. 
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                                                                                               (3.3)                          
 The panel model covers the same time period, 1970-2010, with the same four time windows.  The 
dependent variable, EduExpShare is defined as the county’s educational expenditures divided by county’s 
total expenditures, or the share of county expenditures on education.  Adjusting the educational 
expenditures measure based on total county expenditures accounts for different sized counties.  Even in 
states where the state-level government is the primary funder of education, counties still have discretion 
over their own budgets.  
The control variables were selected based on past literature investigating the determinants of 
educational spending.  Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) find that the two most important determinants of 
spending across states are personal income and number of students.  Thus lagged log personal income 
(         and the share of elementary and high school students in the population (            are 
included as controls.  Porterba (1998) found that an increase in the fraction of elderly residents 
significantly reduces educational spending.  The variable             represents the fraction of the 
population age 65 and over.  Also included are the rural and metro dummies and current period property 
tax per capita (            .  Property taxes are the primary revenue source for state governments and 
thus for educational funding.  Lastly, the model includes state and time fixed effects.  The model employs 
state fixed effects instead of county-level fixed effects since state-level laws provide the legal framework 
for educational spending. 
The variable of interest in equation (3) is the lagged resource abundance variable.  The NR variable 
is lagged one period since the dependent variable is set to the initial year of the time period.  The effects 
of NR likely occur with at least a small lag, versus an instantaneous change.  In addition, the lagged 
period resource term can be considered as exogenous since it is not likely impacted by current period 
county educational expenditure share, or correlated with confounding factors that affect the current ratio 
of educational expenditures to total expenditure.  The model will therefore be estimated with OLS.  I test 
the null hypothesis that resource abundance has no significant effect on local educational expenditures 
(        ) against the alternative that resource abundance negatively impacts educational expenditure 
share (        ).  Rejection of the null hypothesis is evidence that resource abundance tends to curb 
educational spending.    
3.3.2 Educational Spending Model Results 
Equation (3.3) investigates the question of whether or not resource abundance has an effect on the 
educational expenditure decisions of local governments.  It was estimated using OLS, with robust 
standard errors, and state fixed effects.  The results shown in Table 3.6 indicate that coal abundance is not 
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significantly correlated with the share of expenditures devoted to education for local county governments.  
This result does not preclude the possibility that state-level government decisions regarding educational 
expenditures may be influenced by resource abundance, as found in Dunn (2008).  The results do not 
change if the sample is limited to only those states where the county is the primary funder of education. 
Table 3.5:  Estimates of the effect of Resource Abundance on County Educational Expenditure 
Share 
Dependent Variable: Share of County’s Total Expenditures on Education 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-20010), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  OLS FE 
Lag LnY(it) -0.0306 
 (0.0233) 
Lag Metro County 0.0085 
 (0.0054) 
Lag Rural County 0.0005 
 
(0.0058) 
Year 1980 0.0026 
 (0.0144) 
Year 1990 0.0029 
 
(0.0133) 
Lag NR -0.0008 
 
(0.0040) 
Lag Enroll  -0.2372 
 
(0.1580) 
Lag Age65+ -0.1828 
 
(0.1215) 
Property Tax Per Capita -0.0749** 
 
(0.0283) 
Constant 0.5576** 
 
(0.2558) 
Observations 1226 
R-squared 0.03 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
In contrast to findings in Porterba (1998), the proportion of elderly residents has no significant effect 
on a county’s share of expenditures devoted to education.  The fraction of students enrolled in elementary 
and high school lagged initial log income was also not correlated with educational expenditure share of 
local governments, contrary to the finding in Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) using state-level data.  The 
rural and metro variables were not significant either, nor were the year fixed effects.  Only the constant 
term and the property tax per capita term were significant, however, the sign on PropTaxPC is negative.  
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This may be due to the redistribution of education funds from richer counties (usually more urban) to 
poorer counties (usually more rural) in states that use a formula redistribution process.       
3.4 Under-Taxation Due to Resource Abundance 
Another claim in the resource curse literature that is associated with the ‘weak governance’ channel 
is that tax revenue from natural resources free governments from taxing the public, leading to less 
demand for accountability from the public, thereby decreasing democracy and worsening political 
outcomes.  (Ross 2001).  The claim relies on the assumption that greater taxation by a sovereign leads to 
greater demand for representation by the people.  The reduced scrutiny may also result in increased 
corruption by politicians.  Collier (2010) explains that resource revenue is a source of income that does 
not provoke as much scrutiny as taxing people’s incomes.  Taxpayer scrutiny tends to inhibit politicians’ 
ability to expropriate natural resource revenue.  Corrupt politicians often use resource revenue to offset 
income taxation, so that in the end, total revenue is no higher, but politicians are less accountable for its 
expenditure.  One possible result is that investment on public goods, particularly education and health 
care, is reduced, potentially harming growth.  
A few studies have empirically investigated this claim.  In an unpublished dissertation, Harkness 
(2010) examines the first part of the claim; that resource abundance leads to lower taxation, using 
property tax rates across Kentucky counties between 2002 and 2006.  Harkenss (2010) finds the claim to 
be false; resource rich counties in Kentucky actually tax their populations at higher rates than resource-
poor counties.   Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe (2008) uses U.S. state level data and finds evidence 
that natural resource dependence (as measured by the value of annual oil and coal production as a share of 
state income) is negatively correlated with a measure of “taxation effort” by the state.  Using international 
data, Ross (2001) examines the second part of the claim that lower taxes lead to less democracy and finds 
that governments do in fact use low tax rates to reduce pressures for democracy. 
3.4.1 Under-Taxation Model 
I construct a simple panel model of tax revenue per capita (TaxPC), covering the same four time 
periods in order to investigate the relationship between local government taxation decisions and resource 
dependence: 
                                                                                  (4) 
 I use two measures of taxation; the first measure is property tax revenue per capita of county 
  (PropTaxPC), and the second measure is total tax revenue per capita of county   (TotTaxPC).  Property 
taxes are typically the largest source of tax revenue for local governments.   I estimate the model with 
each measure of taxation.  
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Both variables were obtained from the Census of County Governments, which is collected every five 
years on years ending in seven and two.  I used the 1967 data for the period beginning in 1970, 1977 data 
for the period beginning in 1980, 1987 data for the period beginning in 1990, and 1997 data for the period 
beginning in 2000.  Property taxes are levied on real and personal property held within the county by 
individuals and businesses.  Property tax revenue is the largest component of total tax revenue for most 
counties.  Total tax revenue for a county also includes non-property tax revenue, which is predominantly 
composed of sales tax revenue, but also includes several other minor categories such as motor vehicle tax 
fees and business license fees.  West Virginia is the only state in the data with a “Business and Operation” 
tax, so revenue from this tax is included in total tax revenue for counties in that state.  Any severance 
taxes imposed by states are not included in this category. 
The ideal measure of taxation should capture the relative level of ‘taxation effort’ by a county to levy 
taxation on the general public.  If the theory of Ross (2001) and Collier (2010) also applies to the coal 
producing counties of Appalachia, then the model would result in a negative coefficient for the resources 
abundance variable.  However, the measures of ‘taxation effort’ employed here, property tax revenue per 
capita and total tax revenue per capita, are flawed.  In Appalachia, some coal companies privately own the 
lands containing mines, and therefore pay property taxes on those lands.  Furthermore, in some states (e.g. 
West Virginia and Kentucky), ownership of mineral rights is separated from land ownership, and subject 
to property taxation as well.  These components of property taxation will produce upward bias in the 
coefficient estimate for resource abundance for both measures of taxation, since each includes some 
amount of property taxes paid by coal producers.   In future studies, a more appropriate measure would be 
a county level equivalent measure to the one used by Goldberg et al. (2008), which uses a measure of 
“taxation effort.” Taxation effort measures the extent to which a government utilizes its taxing capacity.  
Goldberg et al. (2008) calculated taxation effort by subtracting a measure of taxing capacity from actual 
taxation, based on Berry and Fording (1997).  Tax capacity is defined as the capability of a governmental 
entity to finance its public services. 
The most commonly used state level measure of taxation effort is produced by the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR).  The ACIR provides no such measure for counties, 
but several authors have calculated individual county-level measures of taxation effort by using the ACIR 
methodology, for example Hy, Boland, Hopper, and Sims (1993) and Hoyt (2003).  The ACIR defines tax 
capacity as the amount of revenue that the state would collect if it applied the national-average tax rate to 
its own tax base.   They create a tax-capacity index by dividing a state’s per capita tax capacity by the 
average value of per capita tax capacity across states.  To create the tax effort variable, the ACIR 
calculates the ratio of a state’s tax collections to its tax capacity.  Finally, they calculate a tax-effort index 
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by dividing each state’s tax effort by the average value of effort across states and multiplying by 100.  
Scores above 100 indicate above-average taxation efforts and scores below 100 indicate below-average 
efforts. 
Both the current period resource abundance variable and its lagged value are included as variables of 
prime interest in the model.  I test the null hypothesis that resource abundance has no positive current or 
lagged effects on local level taxation decisions (         and       against the alternative that 
resource abundance negatively impacts tax revenue per capita (         and      .  Rejection of the 
null hypothesis is evidence that resource abundance tends to decrease the amount of property or total 
taxes per capita collected by county governments.   The resource abundance variable can be considered as 
exogenous since it is not likely impacted by county tax rates, or correlated with omitted factors that affect 
county level tax rates.  The model will therefore be estimated with OLS.   
Since the taxation variable are measured in the initial year of the period, I lag the majority of the 
control variables both to help mitigate endogeneity and to allow for the likely time lag in possible effects 
on county level taxation.  The controls include lagged initial personal income, since this signifies a viable 
tax base.  I include lagged dummies for urban and rural areas.  Rural areas are more sparsely populated 
and land owners often own larger quantities of land, and therefore this variable may be positively 
correlated with property taxation.  Lastly, I include state and time fixed effects for the same reasons 
previously discussed.   
Tables 3.7and 3.8 show descriptive statistics for the two measures of local level taxation per capita.  
For both measures, for all years shown, taxes of coal counties are lower than those of non-coal counties, 
which appear to potentially support Ross and Collier’s theory of under-taxation of resource rich regions 
related to national governments. 
Table 3.6: Mean Property Taxes Per Capita, by Year (in Dollars) 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
Non-coal Counties 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.17 
Coal Counties 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 
 
Table 3.7: Mean Total County Taxes Per Capita, by Year (in Dollars) 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
Non-coal Counties 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.28 
Coal Counties 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.15 
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3.4.2 Under-Taxation Model Results 
Equation (4) investigates the question of whether resource abundance contributes to relatively lower 
taxation effort by local governments.  It was estimated using OLS, with robust standard errors, and state-
level fixed effects.  The results shown in Table 3.9 indicate that resource abundance has contrasting 
effects with respect to time on both property tax revenue per capita and total tax revenue per capita.  
Current period resource abundance has a positive and significant effect on both measures of tax revenue, 
while lagged period resource abundance has a negative and significant effect on both measures of tax 
revenue.  The current period coefficients are significant at the 1% level, and the lagged period coefficients 
are significant at the 5% level.  Also for both measures, the magnitude of the contemporaneous positive 
effect of local resources outweighs the magnitude of the lagged negative effect of resources on taxation 
per capita.  The estimated coefficients indicate that the net long-run effect of a unit increase in the 
resource abundance variable is associated with an increase in property taxes per capita of $.0076 and an 
increase in total taxes per capita of $.0168.  The intent of the taxation measures is to capture the effects of 
resource abundance on local governments’ efforts to tax the public in general. But as previously 
discussed, the coefficient estimates produced using these measures of taxation effort are almost certainly 
upward biased, since both measures include property tax revenue paid by coal producers.  Future studies 
should utilize more sophisticated measure of taxation effort, such as those proposed by Goldberg et al 
(2008), or the county-level equivalent of the ACIR’s state level measure. 
Other control variables that were significant include lagged log income per capita, the lagged rural 
dummy, and the time fixed effects.  Lagged log income per capita has a positive effect on both measures 
of tax revenue, which is no surprise, since it indicates that people have more taxable resources in general.  
The lagged rural dummy estimated coefficient indicates a positive effect of rurality on both measures of 
tax revenue, which is likely due to the measurement of tax revenue being on a per capita basis.  Since 
rural areas are more sparsely populated, each citizen pays more on average.  In addition, people tend to 
own larger tracts of land in rural areas, increasing the amount of property taxes paid per capita.   
In summary, my preliminary results do not support extending to Appalachian county governments 
the result found in the international resource curse literature that governments under-tax the public in 
order to circumvent accountability and expropriate resource rents.  Improved measures of taxation effort 
by county level governments are needed to address this question more thoroughly. Given the finding of 
Harkenss (2010) that Kentucky coal counties levy higher tax rates than non-coal counties, more detailed 
research based on improved measures of taxation effort by local governments is warranted in order to 
shed light on this potential effect of resource abundance. 
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Table 3.8: Estimates of the effect of Resource Abundance on Tax Revenues Per Capita of County 
Government 
Dependent Variable: County Tax Revenue Per Capita 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-20010), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  
Dependent Variable: 
PropTaxPC 
Dependent Variable: 
TotTaxPC 
  OLS FE  OLS FE  
LnY(it-2τ) 0.0736** 0.1249*** 
 
(0.0278) (0.0394) 
Lagged Metro -0.0045 -0.0018 
 
(0.0061) (0.0076) 
Lagged Rural 0.0181** 0.0221* 
 
(0.0078) (0.0114) 
Year 1980 -0.0961*** -0.1522*** 
 
(0.0184) (0.033) 
Year 1990 -0.0555*** -0.0860*** 
 
(0.012) (0.0189) 
NR 0.0314*** 0.0572*** 
 
(0.0079) (0.0163) 
Lagged NR -0.0238** -0.0404** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0149) 
Constant -0.5564* -0.9649** 
 
(0.2576) (0.366) 
Observations 1226 1226 
R-squared 0.32 0.44 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have investigated several of the causes for the under-performance by many resource 
rich counties in the Appalachian region.  I examine the effect of coal abundance on educational 
attainment, local (county) level education expenditure decisions, and local level taxation decisions.  I find 
evidence that the educational attainment channel accounts for a significant portion of the negative effect 
of resource abundance.  I find no evidence that resource abundance affects the education expenditure 
allocation decisions of local county governments, nor do I find evidence that resource rich counties test to 
under tax their populations.  In fact, coal abundance is positively correlated with taxation. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
git Average annual growth of real per capita person income BEA 
LnY(it) Beginning of period real per capita personal income BEA 
Metro County  =1 if Beale code ≤ 3 (Metro area) USDA 
Rural County  =1 if Beale code ≥ 7 (Very rural, or popuation  < 
20,000, not adjacent to an urban county) USDA 
NRDum  =1 if NR ≠0, =0 if NR =0. EIA, USGS 
(dOil 
Price)*(NRDum) 
Interaction variable between the percent change in real 
oil price over the time period, and NRDum indicator 
variable EIA, USGS 
Coal0 
 =1 if county has ever produced coal as of initial year of 
period EIA, USGS 
NR 
Coal revenue (price*production) divided by total county 
personal income, during initial year of period 
EIA, USGS 
Year XXXX Year fixed effect - 
SlavePct1860 Percentage of population that were slaves in 1960 Census 
Dropout 
Share of population age 25+ with no high school 
diploma 
 
Bach+ 
Share of population age 25+ with a college degree or 
higher Census 
EmpEdu 
Share of the work force employed in educational 
services Census 
EduExpShare 
Share of educational expenditures in total county 
expenditures 
Census of 
Govt 
Enroll 
Share of school age children enrolled in elementary or 
high school Census 
Age65Up Share of the population age 65 and over Census 
PropTaxPC Property tax revenue per capita in county i 
Census of 
Govt 
TotTaxPC Total (County) tax revenue per capita in county i 
Census of 
Govt 
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Appendix 2:  Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
git 1636 0.012 0.013 -0.033 0.093 
LnY(it) 1636 9.493 0.304 8.322 10.463 
Metro County 1636 0.269 0.444 0 1 
Rural County 1636 0.438 0.496 0 1 
NRDum 1636 0.347 0.476 0 1 
(dOil Price)*(NRDum) 1636 0.127 0.626 -0.940 1.650 
Coal0 1636 0.466 0.499 0 1 
NR 1636 0.110 0.342 0 3.997 
SlavePct1860 1636 6.781 7.901 0 43.900 
Dropout 1636 0.453 0.171 0.086 0.874 
Bach+ 1636 0.097 0.055 0.013 0.475 
EmpEdu 1636 0.084 0.038 0.021 0.380 
EduExpShare 1635 0.198 0.290 0.000 0.881 
Enroll 1636 0.183 0.050 0.072 0.302 
Age65Up 1636 0.132 0.028 0.047 0.259 
PropTaxPC 1635 0.078 0.095 0.001 1.724 
TotTaxPC 1635 0.118 0.143 0.004 1.853 
 
 
Appendix 3: USGS Topography Codes 
Plains Open Hills and Mountains 
1 = Flat plains 13 = Open low hills 
2 = Smooth plains 14 = Open hills 
3 = Irregular plains, slight relief 15 = Open high hills 
4 = Irregular plains 16 = Open low mountains 
 17 = Open high mountains 
Tablelands  
5 = Tablelands, moderate relief Hills and Mountains 
6 = Tablelands, considerable relief 18 = Hills 
7 = Tablelands, high relief 19 = High hills 
8 = Tablelands, very high relief 20 = Low mountains 
 21 = High mountains 
Plains with Hills or Mountains  
9 = Plains with hills  
10 = Plains with high hills  
11 = Plains with low mountains  
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Appendix 4: Growth Regression Results with State-Time Fixed Effect 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Growth Rates of Per Capita Personal Income 1970-2008 
Sample Size: T=4 (1970-2008), N=409 Counties, total obs. = 1636 
  ALL APPALACHIAN 
  COUNTIES BROAD CORE ARC 
Intercept 0.1091*** 0.1476*** 0.1838*** 0.1688*** 
 
(0.0295) (0.0191) (0.0335) (0.0272) 
Initial Income -0.0110*** -0.0156*** -0.0179*** -0.0169*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0028) 
Metro 0.0043*** 0.0036*** 0.0030*** 0.0037*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Rural -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0005 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
dOilPrice*Coal0 0.0054*** 0.0056*** 0.0045*** 0.0055*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
Coal0 -0.0038*** -0.0036** -0.0022 -0.0027** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
     #Counties 1069 409 205 420 
sigma_u 0.0048 0.0074 0.0093 0.0065 
sigma_e 0.0101 0.0093 0.0096 0.0093 
rho 0.1875 0.3828 0.4833 0.3257 
R-squared 
    Within  0.3983 0.4702 0.4353 0.4691 
Between 0.0321 0.0343 0.1786 0.0661 
Overall  0.3253 0.2503 0.2340 0.3283 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 5: ARC County Economic Status in Appalachia, FY 2008 
 
Appendix 6: Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (Beale Codes, USDA) 
Code Description 
 Metro counties: 
1 Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more 
2 Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population 
3 Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population 
 Nonmetro counties: 
4 Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area 
5 Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area 
6 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area 
7 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area 
8 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area 
9 
Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro 
area 
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